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FEMA’S LIABILITY INSURANCE 
MANDATE DENIES LOW-INCOME 
DISASTER SURVIVORS ESSENTIAL 
TRANSPORTATION BENEFITS 
ANNE SIKES HORNSBY* 
For better or worse, we live in a society dominated by the automobile; 
Americans are notoriously dependent on automobiles for access to goods 
and services, for social and economic development, and for sustenance.  
In disaster situations, transportation can be critical to individual and 
household recovery efforts, particularly for those in areas with no public 
transportation or where public transportation has been disrupted.  
FEMA’s statutory mandate charges the agency with “alleviat[ing] the 
suffering and damage,” and unsurprisingly, this mandate encompasses 
disruptions to local transportation systems; the agency’s statutes and 
regulations authorize FEMA to provide financial aid for transportation 
needs, including repair or replacement of disaster–damaged personal 
vehicles.  But to be eligible, FEMA requires proof of an applicant’s auto 
accident liability insurance—despite the fact that such insurance would 
not have covered the damaged vehicle.  The only plausible policy reason 
given for this rule is that FEMA will not provide aid for vehicles not in 
compliance with state law.  However, state mandatory insurance laws exist 
to reduce the numbers of uninsured motorists, a goal with little, if any, 
discernible relationship to FEMA’s mission of disaster relief.  Moreover, 
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most uninsured vehicles are owned by low-income households, and the 
postdisaster punitive effect on uninsured disaster survivors could violate 
FEMA’s antidiscrimination provisions, which include protections on the 
basis of economic status.  What is more, auto insurance mandates are of 
dubious efficacy—raising more questions about the eligibility 
requirement.  This Article examines and critiques the FEMA auto 
insurance mandate in light of the agency’s mission and history, and the 
mandate to alleviate disaster-related economic harms to low-income 
families.  Further, this Article considers both the policy arguments and the 
potential for successful challenges to the policy through litigation or 
agency procedures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans are notoriously dependent on their automobiles.  
According the World Bank, there are approximately 800 vehicles for 
every 1,000 people in the United States, and more than three-fourths of 
those are passenger vehicles.1  Roughly 95% of American households 
own at least one automobile.2  Commuting statistics from the 2009 U.S. 
Census Bureau show that an overwhelming 86.1% of working 
Americans, or about 120 million people, travel an average of 25.1 
minutes to reach their workplace or return home.3  Approximately 86% 
of those commute in a car, truck, or van, and over 75% of those people 
drive alone in a passenger vehicle.4  Although essential to employment, 
commuting to work is only a small portion of the miles we drive, 
representing less than 20% of all trips taken by Americans.5  For the 
vast majority of us, a passenger vehicle is a virtual necessity for access to 
services and goods as well as support for family and community 
interaction and economic and social development.6 
 
1. Motor Vehicles (per 1,000 People), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.VEH.NVEH.P3/countries/1W?display=default (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2013); Passenger Cars (per 1,000 People), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldban
k.org/indicator/IS.VEH.PCAR.P3/countries/1W?display=default (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).  
World Bank defines passenger vehicles as four-wheeled vehicles that seat less than nine 
persons.  See id. 
2. ROBIN CHASE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, YOU ASKED DOES EVERYONE IN AMERICA 
OWN A CAR? 1 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/cambodia/30486/
Publications/everyone_in_america_own_a_car.pdf.  
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMUTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2009, at 2–3 (Sept. 2011). 
4. Id. at 2 tbl.1. 
5. Id. at 1 (citing A. SANTOS ET AL., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
SUMMARY OF TRAVEL TRENDS: 2009 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 21 tbl.10 
(June 2011), available at http://nhts.ornl.gov/2009/pub/stt.pdf). 
6. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NPTS BRIEF: MOBILITY AND 
THE MELTING POT 3 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter NPTS BRIEF], available at 
http://nhts.ornl.gov/briefs/Mobility%20and%20the%20Melting%20Pot.pdf.  Former 
Massachusetts Governor and presidential candidate Mitt Romney said in a 2011 interview: 
[T]he government, of course, has a lot of mandates, and I know folks don’t like 
that[—]mandates kids go to school, mandates they have to have auto insurance if 
[they] have an automobile.  And my conservative friends say, “Well, we don’t have 
to have automobiles.”  And it’s like what state do you live in?  Of course you have 
to have automobiles in this nation. 
Bill  O’Reilly,   Romney   on   ‘The   Factor’:   No   Perry   Beef,   Obama’s   Iran   Failure   and 
States’   Right   to   Mandate,   FOXNEWS.COM   (Sept.   14,   2011),   http://www.foxnews.com/
on-air/oreilly/2011/09/14/romney-factor-no-perry-beef-obamas-iran-failure-and-states-right-
mandate. 
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Populations who cannot drive—those who are too young, too old, 
disabled, or ill—rely on others who do drive as public transit options 
may be limited or inadequate and are nonexistent in most small towns 
and rural areas.7  Studies show that access to a working vehicle has an 
impact on the ability to find employment.8  Lack of adequate 
transportation has been cited as a factor in a wide array of social and 
health problems, as far reaching as an observed 25% increase in obesity 
in rural children who cannot access after-school programs9 and veterans 
who report increased health problems due, in part, to inability to reach 
VA facilities.10  The need for a vehicle is particularly pronounced among 
low-income populations.11 
When disasters occur, this dependence on personal vehicles can be 
even more critical in the lives of those affected and their communities.  
With public and private services interrupted, facilities destroyed, schools 
and hospitals relocated, and families displaced or separated, most 
survivors need ongoing, long-term access to transportation to obtain 
even basic necessities.12  Goods and services within easy reach 
predisaster may have been destroyed or damaged, requiring individuals 
to travel greater distances to find health care, fuel, retail pharmacies, 
and groceries.13  Moreover, public transportation may be disrupted for 
long periods of time, making individual transportation the only viable 
 
7. See Nicholas Farber, School Buses and Special Needs Transportation: Options for 
Policymakers, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/transportation/schoolbusneeds08.pdf (noting the need for 
“additional mobility for the general population in rural areas, where public transportation is 
limited or nonexistent.  Around 38 percent of the nation’s rural residents live in a community 
without public transportation, and another 28 percent live in a community with few public 
transportation options.”); Lisa Margonelli, Thinking Outside the Bus, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011, 9:30 PM) http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/
17/thinking-outside-the-bus/ (reporting that only 5% of Americans use public transit for 
work, and only 1.2% of those in rural communities).  
8. NPTS BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3 (“The impact of the limited mobility of lower-income 
men is not known for the specific individual, but overall such a limited range affects access to 
potential employers, and may restrict access to health services, education, shopping at 
discount stores, and a vast array of social and recreational activities.”). 
9. See id.; Margonelli, supra note 7. 
10. See Margonelli, supra note 7. 
11. Steven Garasky et al., Transiting to Work: The Role of Private Transportation for 
Low-Income Households, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 64, 65 (2006). 
12. See, e.g., Alice Fothergill & Lori A. Peek, Poverty and Disasters in the United States: 
A Review of Recent Sociological Findings, 32 NAT’L HAZARDS 89, 98, 100 (2004). 
13. See id. at 100. 
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alternative for those who ordinarily use public transit.14  Rural citizens 
without public transportation options may be the most vulnerable.  
Restoring Americans’ access to private transportation would seemingly 
be an important priority after a disaster, as it is necessary to promote 
independence and return lives to order as soon as possible. 
Disaster recovery widely impacts those directly affected as well as 
our larger communities and economies.  In 2011, the President declared 
ninety-nine FEMA major disasters, and in 2012, forty-seven.15  During 
that time, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico all 
had at least one.16  The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (the “Stafford Act”)17 authorized the 
establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), now a branch of the Department of Homeland Security, which 
spearheads federal response after disasters.18  Created through the 
merger of several agencies with disaster-related duties in 1979, and with 
a legacy beginning in 1803,19 FEMA is charged with one central purpose: 
 
14. E.g., Rich Sampson, The Return of New Orleans’ Transit Legacy, COMMUNITY 
TRANSP., June 1–6, 2008, at 6, 9–12, available at 
http://web1.ctaa.org/webmodules/webarticles/articlefiles/NORTA.pdf.  
15. Disaster Declarations for 2011, FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year/2011?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1=All (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013); Disaster Declarations for 2012, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year
/2012?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1=All (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).  The definition of major 
disaster, as used by FEMA, is 
[a]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, 
winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or 
explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the 
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major 
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources 
of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the 
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. 
44 C.F.R. § 206.2(a)(17) (2011). 
16. Disaster Declarations for 2011, supra note 15; Disaster Declarations for 2012, supra 
note 15.  The other four states and the year of their last major disaster declaration are 
Arizona (2010), Michigan (2008), Nevada (2008), and South Carolina (2006).  Disaster 
Declarations by State, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/state (last visited Jan. 20, 
2013).  For FEMA Disasters by year or state, see Disaster Declarations, FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/disasters (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
18. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf. 
19. For a short history of government disaster response agencies and legislations, see 
About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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assisting state and local governments “to alleviate the suffering and 
damage” caused by emergencies and major disasters through 
prevention, mitigation, and recovery.20  FEMA states that “[t]he 
recovery mission seeks to support communities in rebuilding so 
individuals, civic institutions, businesses, and governmental 
organizations can function on their own, return to normal life, and 
protect against future hazards.”21  In a major disaster, the Stafford Act 
expressly authorizes grants of financial assistance to households and 
individuals for “necessary expenses or serious needs,” recognizing that 
among those essentials are funds to repair or replace individuals’ 
personal vehicles.22 
Despite this directive, survivors seeking FEMA aid to repair or 
replace a disaster-damaged vehicle are denied aid unless they can 
 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 5121.  Section 5121 states, in relevant portion: 
(b) It is the intent of the Congress, by this chapter, to provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local 
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and 
damage which result from such disasters by— 
(1) revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief 
programs; 
(2) encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster 
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and 
organizations by the States and by local governments; 
(3) achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster 
preparedness and relief programs; 
(4) encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect 
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace 
governmental assistance; 
(5) encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from 
disasters, including development of land use and construction regulations; 
and 
(6) providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private 
losses sustained in disasters[.] 
Id.  Most of the powers given to the President by the Act were delegated by President George 
H.W. Bush to the Director of FEMA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5164.  Exec. Order No. 12,673, 
54 Fed. Reg. 12,571 (Mar. 23, 1989).  One notable exception is that the President, and not the 
FEMA Director, has the authority to declare a major disaster.  Id. 
21. Region IV Recovery Division, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/region-iv-recovery-
division (last updated Dec. 18, 2012). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (including aid for “transportation”); 
see also Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disaster-
assistance-available-fema (last updated Aug. 10, 2012) (listing “disaster-related damaged to a 
vehicle” among “necessary expenses and serious needs caused by the disaster” for which 
money is available). 
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provide proof of current auto liability insurance.23  The reasons for this 
precondition to relief are unclear, despite requests to FEMA 
representatives in response to assistance denials.  The requirement is 
not stated within any FEMA statutory authority or regulations and was 
never proposed or published in the Federal Register for public 
comment.  In fact, the requirement is difficult to find among FEMA’s 
public information.  The hinging of aid for damage or destruction of a 
vehicle on liability insurance—and liability insurance only—creates a 
disconnect in logic. 
Unlike comprehensive or collision auto insurance, liability insurance 
has no bearing whatsoever on whether an owner’s car can be repaired, 
regardless of the source of the damage.  Auto insurance for liability only 
covers vehicle (property damage) and medical expenses (bodily injury) 
for persons in other vehicles when injured by the insured auto in an at-
fault situation.24  In a disaster situation, then, pure liability insurance will 
not repair or replace a survivor’s automobile.  Collision coverage or 
comprehensive insurance, on the other hand, will likely pay its insured 
parties in full for any damage to their vehicles, and those owners will not 
need FEMA assistance to continue with the necessity of transportation.25  
Those with liability coverage only are also eligible for financial 
assistance in this category, and SBA loans may be available to those 
with sufficient income and assets to qualify.26  Ultimately, FEMA’s 
practice leaves only those with neither collision nor liability to bear the 
losses in this category with no assistance, regardless of the level of need.  
It is logical to expect this category to include our poorest and most 
economically vulnerable citizens. 
 
23. This requirement appears in FEMA’s Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the 
Individuals & Households Program handout, FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER: 
APPLICANT’S GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALS & HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 15 (2008), available 
at http://www.fema.gov/help-after-disaster, and in the FAQ portion of its website, Why am I 
Not Eligible for Assistance?, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/why-am-i-not-eligible-assistance 
(last updated June 15, 2012). 
24. A clear explanation appears in A Consumer’s Guide to: Auto Insurance published by 
the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner: “Washington state requires 
liability coverage.  This covers bodily injury and damage to property that you cause to others 
while using your car.”  WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE 
TO: AUTO INSURANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/auto/c
onsumerguideautoins.pdf. 
25. Id.; see also Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23. 
26. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program, 
supra note 23, at 4, 6. 
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It is said that disasters are great equalizers that strike across 
demographic and economic strata, which is often true for the terrible 
and tragic initial impact on communities following a major disaster.27  
For low-income households with fewer financial reserves, disaster 
creates a far more difficult time in recovery.28  A number of 
commentators and scholars have asserted that FEMA practices have at 
times failed to assist those most in need,29 in contravention of Congress’s 
express directive to adopt policies which prevent discrimination on the 
basis of economic status.30  Despite the centrality of the automobile to 
our daily lives, there has been little comment, and apparently no legal 
challenge to date, to the policy which denies otherwise qualifying 
survivors financial assistance for uninsured personal vehicles.31  In Part I 
of the Article, I argue that a mandatory auto liability insurance 
requirement is counter to FEMA’s purpose and antidiscrimination 
 
27. Fothergill & Peek, supra note 12, at 89. 
28. Id. at 90, 98–101. 
29. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster 
Recovery Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 48 (2006) (“The federal 
emergency response to this unprecedented natural disaster [Hurricane Katrina] suffered from 
abysmal planning and a lethargic response [by FEMA] to the needs of hurricane survivors in 
the devastated Gulf Coast.”); John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical 
Look at FEMA’s Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 
443, 477–78 (2008) (explaining that FEMA failed victims of Hurricane Katrina in many ways, 
namely “fail[ing] to provide adequate information and temporary housing assistance”); 
Elizabeth Pierson Hernandez, Comment, Twice Uprooted: How Government Policies 
Exacerbate Injury to Low-Income Americans Following Natural Disasters, 14 SCHOLAR 219, 
223 (2011) (noting that over 10,000 people in Texas were rejected FEMA housing aid after 
Hurricane Dolly). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  Section 5151(a) says in relevant part: 
Non-discrimination in disaster assistance. 
 (a) Regulations for equitable and impartial relief operations: 
 The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such regulations as may be 
necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Federal assistance functions at 
the site of a major disaster or emergency.  Such regulations shall include provisions 
for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the processing of applications, and 
other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and 
impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, 
nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic status. 
Id. 
31. One of the few legal articles to mention this policy is Hooks & Miller, supra note 29, 
at 48 n.105 (“However, FEMA’s procedures in awarding such assistance can exclude low-
income people.  For example, benefits to replace vehicles lost in the storm were allocated 
only to those who could demonstrate they carried insurance on their vehicles (although such 
insurance almost never covers losses from events such as Katrina).”). 
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directive and inconsistent with legislative intent.  Part II discusses 
whether the underlying state law public policy is effective in advancing 
FEMA’s articulated reasons for its prerequisite, examining the 
effectiveness of mandatory auto insurance laws in reducing uninsured 
motorist percentages and costs of accidents overall.  Part III examines 
whether FEMA’s policy is vulnerable to judicial review or 
administrative procedure and how such a challenge might proceed and 
ultimately fare.  Finally, Part IV concludes that via litigation or methods 
short of litigation, FEMA should reconsider and eliminate the 
postdisaster auto liability insurance requirement. 
II. FEMA’S POLICY REQUIRING DISASTER SURVIVORS TO PROVE 
CURRENT AUTO LIABILITY INSURANCE 
The source of FEMA’s conditioning assistance for motor vehicles 
upon proof of liability insurance is unclear.  Searches for public 
documents relating how FEMA arrived at this policy have been 
fruitless.  Nowhere within either the text of the Stafford Act, its 
codification, its legislative history, or in any regulations authorizing and 
governing FEMA’s activities is auto liability insurance mentioned, nor is 
compliance with state auto insurance laws required as a prerequisite to 
repair or replace a vehicle.32  Its absence is notable. 
Regulations promulgated for FEMA to carry out its mission include 
a list of factors which may lead to ineligibility for assistance,33 but auto 
 
32. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207; Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 
Stat. 143; 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.1–.115 (2011); S. REP. NO. 93-778 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070. 
33. 44 C.F.R. § 206.113(b).  The conditions are as follows: 
(b) Conditions of ineligibility.  We may not provide assistance under this 
subpart: 
(1) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who are 
displaced from other than their pre-disaster primary residence; 
(2) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who have 
adequate rent-free housing accommodations; 
(3) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who own a 
secondary or vacation residence within reasonable commuting distance to 
the disaster area, or who own available rental property that meets their 
temporary housing needs; 
(4) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who 
evacuated the residence in response to official warnings solely as a 
precautionary measure and who are able to return to the residence 
immediately after the incident; 
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liability insurance is not among them.  Furthermore, as will be addressed 
later in this Article, the insurance industry and others have expressed 
serious doubt as to the efficacy of mandatory insurance laws,34 making 
the punitive actions of FEMA in enforcement of these laws, especially in 
this context, even more puzzling. 
FEMA’s rationale for the liability insurance predicate to this form of 
transportation assistance seemingly appears only in its most informal 
policy statements, such as its publication in its “help” manual, its mobile 
assistance site, and its website.35  Many applicants see it for the first time 
as a code symbol in a response letter from FEMA used to classify and 
inform applicants of the rejections of requests.36  For uninsured motorist 
applicants seeking assistance with a disaster-damaged assistance, a five-
 
(5) For housing assistance, for improvements or additions to the pre-
disaster condition of property, except those required to comply with local 
and State ordinances or eligible mitigation measures; 
(6) To individuals or households who have adequate insurance 
coverage and where there is no indication that insurance proceeds will be 
significantly delayed, or who have refused assistance from insurance 
providers; 
(7) To individuals or households whose damaged primary residence 
is located in a designated special flood hazard area, and in a community 
that is not participating in the National Flood Insurance Program, except 
that financial assistance may be provided to rent alternate housing and for 
medical, dental, funeral expenses and uninsurable items to such individuals 
or households.  However, if the community in which the damaged property 
is located qualifies for and enters the NFIP during the six-month period 
following the declaration then the individual or household may be eligible; 
(8) To individuals or households who did not fulfill the condition to 
purchase and maintain flood insurance as a requirement of receiving 
previous Federal disaster assistance; 
(9) For business losses, including farm businesses and self-
employment; or 
(10) For any items not otherwise authorized by this section. 
Id. 
34. See, e.g., Lynn Knauf, Despite Compulsory Coverage Laws, Fight Against UMs 
Marches On, INS. J. (Aug. 18, 2003), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/partingshots
/2003/08/18/31637.htm; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured 
Drivers, Says Insurer Trade Group, INS. J. (July 25, 2004), http://www.insurancejournal.com/n
ews/national/2004/07/25/44371.htm. 
35. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program, 
supra note 23, at 15; Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23. 
36. This code system was criticized post-Katrina and raised in plaintiff’s claims in 
Ridgely v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 512 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(complaining that FEMA’s use of “confusing codes, instead of understandable explanations” 
was one process that violated Due Process). 
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letter code with this elaboration will appear: “IVINS-Vehicle - No 
Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a 
vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law.”37 
In searching for the source of this policy, a list of reasons for denial 
to responses appear under the question Why am I not Eligible for 
Assistance?38  Four coded items relating to rejection of an individual’s 
application seeking assistance to repair or replace a vehicle are among 
them, and two of the four cite failure to comply with state laws.39  (The 
other one is a similar code for failure to prove the vehicle is registered 
with the state motor vehicle department.)40  This is the only instance in 
any category on the list where noncompliance with state law is cited as a 
reason for individuals or households to fail to qualify for financial 
assistance.41 
A. Legislative History of the Stafford Act and FEMA’s IVINS Policy 
A review of the legislative history of the Stafford Act’s predecessor 
bills, in particular a comprehensive report on disaster response by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), makes it clear that Congress 
intentionally eliminated the requirement of insurance as an eligibility 
factor for individual aid.42  The CRS report includes a section-by-section 
description of the newly passed Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and 
discusses the changes made in the bill during conference between the 
Senate and the House.43  In its explanation of 314, titled “Insurance 
Requirement,” the CRS notes that the compromise committee elected 
 
37. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.  The four items related to vehicles are: 
x IVINS-Vehicle - No Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be 
provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law. 
x IVNE-Vehicle - Non Essential: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a 
vehicle when a second vehicle is available. 
x IVNR-Vehicle - Not Licensed/Registered: Disaster assistance may not be 
provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law. 
x IVRC-Vehicle - Cosmetic Damage: There was not enough damage to your 
vehicle for you to qualify for this program. 
Id. 
41. See id. (providing a complete list of rejection codes). 
42. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFTER DISASTER STRIKES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 93-288, at 742 (1974). 
43. See id. at 742–43. 
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to reject the idea of mandatory insurance of any kind as a qualifying 
factor for receipt of aid for individuals.44 
Noting the conflicting positions of the administration and the Senate 
on this issue, CRS reports that a Senate version of the bill which 
expounded a mandatory insurance requirement to any type of public or 
private assistance provided was pared down to a very limited 
requirement.45  The limited requirement, which remains intact in 
significant part today, applied the requirement only to certain public 
entities under specific programs of assistance.46  Even the broader, 
discarded Senate version would not have denied aid to those without 
insurance after a first disaster: it applied prospectively.47  That is, 
survivors were to insure replacement property for which they had 
received FEMA aid to purchase; otherwise they would be denied aid in 
a subsequent disaster.48 
Significantly, one key point of concern raised in opposition to the 
requirement was its harsh impact on those whose failure to insure was 
due to an inability to pay the cost of insurance.49  Recognition of the 
severity of the result postdisaster on low-income families, then, was 
 
44. Id. at 741–42. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 742.  
47. Id. 
48. Section 314 of the Senate bill required applicants for assistance to obtain any 
“reasonably available, adequate and necessary insurance” and provided that property for 
which assistance was previously provided was not eligible to receive additional assistance in 
the future unless all insurance required by such section had been obtained and maintained.  S. 
REP. NO. 93-778, at 188 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3082. 
49. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-100, at 12 (1973).  The report describes: 
 A provision of the proposed bill will require that loan applicants obtain 
insurance, when reasonably available, to cover property losses in future disasters.  
Disaster insurance will ensure that financing would be available to help individuals 
get back on their feet after disasters and protect the disaster victim from future 
losses and increased debt. 
 The emergency loan program, even as modified by PL 93-24, may in fact 
discriminate against the needy.  They may not be able to qualify for a loan, since 
applicants must demonstrate some ability to repay and, currently, there is no other 
special provision to aid needy disaster victims.  As an essential component of the 
new disaster assistance program, the legislation proposes to make funds available to 
the States to provide grants to needy persons affected by disasters.  Since the States 
already have ongoing and recognized machinery to deal with the needy, such as 
State welfare offices, they can more appropriately and expeditiously administer this 
type of grant. 
Id. 
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within the considerations in the debate in Congress as it contemplated 
the legislation.50  Some policymakers and legislators proposed adoption 
of a national disaster insurance program, similar to the National Flood 
Insurance Program, and hearings included comments on the effects that 
a mandate of insurance would have on the poor. 51  
Speaking in opposition to the proposal that would have required 
people to obtain insurance on property repaired or replaced with 
FEMA aid, Red Cross officials made a point of its disaster-response 
philosophy of “meeting disaster-caused needs, not disaster losses,” and 
expressed reservations and strongly held concerns about imposing 
insurance requirements on low- and middle-income families.52  The then-
director of FEMA stated his support for a financial aid program in the 
form of outright grants to those who could not qualify for low interest 
 
50. See To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief 
Legislation Part 5 (Proposed Legislation): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Disaster Relief of 
the Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d Cong. 168, 206 (1973). 
51. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 188, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3082; See To 
Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation Part 5, supra 
note 50, at 168.  The Senate version, appearing below, was not adopted by Congress, who 
rejected the idea of universal disaster insurance as a prerequisite to receiving future 
assistance: 
 Applicants for assistance under this Act must obtain any reasonably available, 
adequate and necessary insurance to protect against losses to property which is 
replaced, restored, repaired or reconstructed with that assistance.  
 Property for which assistance was previously provided under this Act is not 
eligible to receive additional assistance in the future unless all insurance required by 
this section has been obtained and maintained. 
S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 188. 
52. To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation 
Part 5, supra note 50, at 168.  Statement of George M. Elsey, President, American National 
Red Cross: 
[W]e are concerned about the requirement that disaster victims must have 
purchased hazard insurance before being eligible for federally funded assistance 
after a disaster. . . .   
 Certainly the Red Cross does not object to requiring those who can afford to do 
so to purchase insurance but there will always be a certain number of low or even 
middle income families among them older people living on social security or other 
pensions, and young families struggling to make ends meet, who may not be able to 
afford the cost of insurance even at subsidized rates. . . . 
 If the legislation you are now considering proposes grants to people whose 
income level is so low that they cannot qualify for loans, yet conditions eligibility for 
grants on the purchase of insurance against future disaster losses, is it logical to 
expect such people to buy and maintain such insurance? 
Id. at 168. 
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loans made available through the Small Business Administration (but 
subject to forgiveness), the only program available at that time to 
individuals and households.53  Then Governor of Virginia, Linwood 
Holton, expressed similar sentiments and was unable to support a 
mandate with which the needy were unable to comply.54 
Ultimately, the insurance mandate for property procured with 
financial assistance from FEMA was removed from the bill, leaving a 
requirement only for a very limited set of public facilities.55  The CRC 
report states clearly of the adopted bill: “[M]ost important, there is no 
requirement for the purchase of insurance for property owned by 
individuals.  All of the affected programs apply to governmental 
activities.  Thus, an individual who failed to acquire insurance after a 
first disaster would suffer no penalty if a second disaster strikes.”56  This 
statement not only reflects the outright rejection of an individual 
insurance mandate, but also demonstrates that even under the initially 
proposed Senate and Administration version, nothing as harsh as a 
penalty for first time disaster survivors was on the table.57  Despite this 
history, somehow the insurance requirement for personal vehicles was 
 
53. Id. at 60.  Statement of Thomas Dunne, Administrator, Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration: 
The provisions of title V on grants to the needy give special recognition that there 
are people in this country who don’t have the ability to borrow money. . . . 
 What we are trying to reach through the need program by these grants are 
people who don’t have the ability to borrow.  This is special recognition. 
Id. 
54. Id. at 206.  Statement of Hon. Linwood Holton, Governor, Commonwealth Of 
Virginia: 
The requirement for the purchase of disaster insurance as a prerequisite for grants 
to cover uninsured property losses of needy families is questioned.  A portion of the 
grant could be used to obtain the insurance initially, but the maintenance of this 
insurance by needy families would present a problem . . .   
Id. at 193.  Governor Holton went on to state, “I don’t see how you can force them to do it if 
they don’t have the money to buy it with.”  Id. at 206. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 5154 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  The current version of the statute retains 
virtually the same provisions, though their internal references to other sections have been 
updated as modifications have been made over time.  Id. 
56. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFTER DISASTER STRIKES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 93-288, at 742 (1974). 
57. To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation 
Part 5, supra note 50, at 73 (statement of Sen. Buckley) (“My understanding of the 
Administration bill is that the taking out of disaster insurance would not be a precondition for 
help during the first disaster.”). 
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grafted into FEMA’s eligibility criteria, in seeming contravention of the 
Congressional intent.58  FEMA does not impose any similar insurance 
mandate on any additional items in this “Other Needs” category for 
which financial assistance may be provided, which includes potentially 
insurable items such as medical and dental expenses, personal 
belongings, and funeral expenses.59 
Similarly, no other aid eligibility criteria for individuals or 
households are based on compliance with state laws.60  The 
complications of FEMA injecting itself into the enforcement of state 
auto insurance laws begs the question of whether this is a worthy policy 
position.  Unlike the recent debate regarding a health insurance 
individual mandate, auto liability insurance laws have public support.61  
Some opposed to auto liability insurance laws believe state legislatures 
 
58. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1037, at 90 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3091, 3100.  The report describes: 
It should be noted that it was the intention of the conferees, by limiting the 
applicability of section 314 to sections 402 and 419 of this legislation and section 803 
of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, not to require under 
this legislation the purchase of insurance with respect to property owned by 
individuals. 
Id. 
59. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 22.  FEMA’s report notes: 
Other than Housing Needs. 
Money is available for necessary expenses and serious needs caused by the disaster.  
This includes: 
x Disaster-related medical and dental expenses. 
x Disaster-related funeral and burial expenses. 
x Clothing; household items (room furnishings, appliances); tools (specialized 
or protective clothing and equipment) required for your job; necessary educational 
materials (computers, school books, supplies). 
x Fuels for primary heat source (heating oil, gas). 
x Clean-up items (wet/dry vacuum, dehumidifier). 
x Disaster-related damage to a vehicle. 
x Moving and storage expenses related to the disaster (moving and storing 
property to avoid additional disaster damage while disaster-related repairs are being 
made to the home). 
x Other necessary expenses or serious needs as determined by FEMA.  
x Other expenses that are authorized by law.  
Id. 
60. See, e.g., Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23. 
61. See AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY & 
INSURANCE COMMITTEE RESOURCE GUIDE 15, available at http://www.aamva.org/uploaded
files/mainsite/content/driverlicensingidentification/auto_insurance_financial_responsibility/fr
%20guide.pdf.  
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are pressured into seemingly easy fixes by a few constituents who were 
injured and uncompensated for their losses.62  Regardless, there is still 
good reason to wonder why FEMA is interested in enforcing this 
particular set of state laws.  In order to properly address this policy 
question, it is helpful to examine the development and effectiveness of 
state mandatory automobile insurance laws. 
B. FEMA’s IVINS Policy and Mandatory Auto Insurance Laws 
FEMA’s sole published explanation for the denial of benefits to the 
owners of uninsured, disaster-damaged vehicles is that it may deny aid 
to those owners not in compliance with state law.63  Taking that 
statement at face value, an examination of these compulsory insurance 
laws and their impact is valuable.  There is no question that thousands of 
individuals suffer injury or loss as a result of the negligence of drivers of 
uninsured vehicles.64  “Unlicensed and uninsured drivers are involved in 
more than 20 percent of the fatal crashes on America’s highways,” said 
Laura Kotelman, in an address at the annual meeting of the National 
Conference of State Legislators.65  Unrecovered losses caused by 
uninsured drivers were estimated by the insurance industry at $10.8 
billion in 2007 alone.66  States, traditionally the entities who have wide 
regulatory powers over the insurance industry,67 have addressed the 
 
62. See Knauf, supra note 34. 
63. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No Liability 
Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms 
of state law.”). 
64. Fortunately, the overall number of vehicle accidents has declined dramatically since 
2000.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Transportation: Motor Vehicle Accidents and Fatalities, in 
THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 693 tbl.1103 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/co
mpendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1103.pdf. 
65. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says 
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34.  Ms. Kotelman is Property Casualty Insurers Association 
of America’s (PCI)’s regional manager and senior counsel.  Id. 
66. See Larry Copeland, 1 in 7 Drivers are Not Insured: State Requirements Appear 
Ineffective, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  Section 1012 states: 
(a) State regulation[.]   
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to 
the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business.  
(b) Federal regulation[.]   
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or 
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uninsured motorist problem in various ways, most commonly by passing 
laws that make it mandatory to carry some form of auto insurance and 
penalize those who do not insure their vehicles.68 
Motor vehicle insurance mandates were first enacted in 
Massachusetts in 1927 and not by another state until New York in 1956 
and North Carolina in 1957.69  By 1970, these were still the only three, 
but between 1971 and 1976, sixteen states adopted “no-fault” laws that 
made first-party insurance mandatory along with compulsory auto 
liability coverage.70  The number of state insurance mandate laws grew 
slowly after that time, but now forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia require some minimal level of insurance on individually 
owned automobiles.71  The type of insurance required, the enforcement 
mechanisms, and the penalties for noncompliance vary widely from state 
to state.72  The array of mandatory or compulsory insurance laws alone 
makes evident the states’ independence in oversight of the auto 
insurance industry and the lack of consensus about the most effective 
approach. 
More basically, the scope of the uninsured motorist problem and 
whether mandatory liability insurance laws have an impact on the 
problem are issues that are anything but settled.  A 1999 study by The 
National Association of Independent Insurers found compulsory auto 
insurance laws were largely ineffective and might be making the 
 
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to 
the business of insurance: Provided, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, 
and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, . . . shall be applicable to the business of 
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law. 
Id. 
68. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says 
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34; AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, 
at 16. 
69. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 11. 
70. Scott E. Harrington, Taxing Low Income Households in Pursuit of the Public 
Interest: The Case of Compulsory Automobile Insurance, in INSURANCE, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ROBERT I. MEHR 115, 116 
(Sandra G. Gustavson & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1994). 
71. Only New Hampshire has no requirement for individuals to insure their vehicles.  
INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 1 (2011). 
72. Cassandra R. Cole et al., The Uninsured Motorist Problem: An Investigation of the 
Impact of Enforcement and Penalty Severity on Compliance, 19 J. INS. REG. 613, 615 (2001); 
see AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 25, 27, 38, 50 (comparing, for 
example, the approaches of Arkansas, California, Illinois, and Michigan). 
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uninsured motorist problem worse in the long run.73  It found that 
among twelve states that enacted such laws between 1976 and 1984, only 
four saw a reduction from the first full year to 1985, and the other eight 
saw increases in uninsured motorists from 3.5% to 57.9%.74  For states 
that enacted compulsory liability laws post-1985, half saw increases in 
the uninsured motorist population and half saw decreases.75  During this 
time, the number of claims and the losses caused by so-called 
“financially irresponsible drivers” went up.76  Significantly, the Insurance 
Research Council’s (IRC) historical data shows a relatively stable rate 
of uninsured motorists, somewhere between 13% and 16% between 
1990 and 2009,77 during the same time that a number of states enacted 
their laws.78 
Even the basic statistics on uninsured motorists, however, can be 
difficult to determine with confidence.  There are at least four methods 
of estimating the number of uninsured motorists or motor vehicles,79 
with no consensus on which gives the most accurate picture.  State 
agencies, industry organizations, and independent scholars or entities 
have used these methods alternatively or in some combination to 
generate a projected number and percentage of uninsured vehicles on 
U.S. roads.80  The IRC, an insurance industry trade organization,81 
 
73. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 615–16; A Failed Mechanism?, INS. ADVOC., Aug. 29, 
1998, at 1 (1998). 
74. A Failed Mechanism?, supra note 73, at 15. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists.html.  The rate 
declined from 14.9% in 2003 to 13.8% in 2007, then rose to 14.3% in 2008 and fell to 13.8 % 
in 2009, according to the IRC.  Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614–15; Compulsory 
Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra. 
78. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614–15. 
79. J. Daniel Khazzoom, What We Know About Uninsured Motorists and How Well We 
Know What We Know, 19 J. INS. REG. 59, 64 (2000).  The four methods are: 
1. Matching of a DMV’s drivers’ registration database against insurers’ 
databases to identify vehicles that have been registered but not insured.   
2. Random sampling of registered vehicles.   
3. Comparison of the frequency of claims paid under uninsured motorist 
insurance with the bodily injury claims paid under liability insurance.   
4. Sampling surveys of the insurance status of automobiles owned by 
households. 
Id. 
80. See, e.g., infra notes 82–86. 
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publishes statistics on the percentages of uninsured motorists by state 
each year, calculating it by comparing the number of bodily injury 
claims (those covered by at-fault drivers’ insurance) with the number of 
uninsured motorist claims (those covered by the injured party’s own 
uninsured motorist insurance).82  The IRC compiles the information 
from nine auto insurance companies, which collectively represent 
approximately 50% of the private passenger auto liability insurance 
premiums in the United States.83  This method is considered to be less 
accurate than either a database or random sampling method,84 but the 
IRC statistics have been relied upon in a number of related studies since 
1989,85 all of which would be far less valuable for future comparisons 
should the IRC change its method of tracking uninsured motorists in the 
future. 
J. Daniel Khazzoom, a retired Economics professor from the 
University of California-Berkeley, undertook an examination of various 
sources of information reported on uninsured drivers, and points out the 
shortcomings and biases inherent in each methodology.86  He and others 
say that the IRC’s methods upwardly bias the percentage of uninsured 
motorists on the road because the method does not account for hit-and-
run accidents, liability claims denied for other reasons, the possibility 
that vehicle ownership and the driver are not interlinked, uninsured 
 
81. In Uninsured Motorists, the Insurance Research Council describes itself as: 
[A] division of The American Institute for Chartered Property and Casualty 
Underwriters (The Institutes), a not-for-profit organization dedicated to providing 
educational programs, professional certification, and research for the property-
casualty insurance business.  The Council’s purpose is to provide timely and reliable 
research to all parties involved in the public policy issues affecting risk and 
insurance, but the Council does not lobby or take legislative positions.  The Council 
is supported by leading property-casualty insurance organizations. 
INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 40. 
82. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77. 
83. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 27–28. 
84. AAMVA UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP. ET AL., 
STANDARDIZING THE WAY WE MEASURE THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE RATE 9, 
available at http://www.aamva.org/uploadedFiles/MainSite/Content/SolutionsBestPractices/B
estPracticesModelLegislation(1)/StandardizingTheWayWeMeasureUninsuredMVRates.pdf. 
85. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 2–3; see Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614 
n.1; Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77. 
86. Khazzoom, supra note 79; Stacey Palevsky, Memoir of Baghdad Recalls Riches of a 
Vanishing Culture, JWEEKLY.COM (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/58927/
memoir-of-baghdad-recalls-riches-of-a-vanishing-culture/ (“Khazzoom, now 78, retired from 
U.C. Berkeley’s economics department in 2000.”). 
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motorists involved in more than one accident, disputed and litigated 
claims, and fraud in UM claims, along with a lack of effort or estimate of 
bias in the calculations.87  Similarly, accidents with out-of-state insured 
motorists or stolen vehicles may be counted within UM claims as well.88  
In an attempt to address this confusion, the American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrators has advocated a standardization of 
methods for measurement of uninsured motor vehicles.89  It advocates 
for what it views as the most accurate methods of either random survey 
techniques or a current database,90 both of which include considerable 
costs beyond the IRC method. 
Even the term “uninsured motorist” is a misnomer, since mandatory 
liability insurance attaches to vehicles, not their drivers.91  Some 
motorists have more than one insurable vehicle, and may insure one, but 
not another.92  In fact, owners of as many as 41% of uninsured vehicles 
report that the car, truck or van is uninsured because it is either “not in 
operating condition” or “runs but . . . is not being used.”93  Arguably, 
these owners should not be included within the uninsured motorist 
category, since they claim their vehicles are not on the road.  How this 
“hybrid” person or his or her vehicle is considered in the various models 
can make a significant, if not dramatic, difference in the calculation of 
the number of uninsured drivers.94 
The variety of required auto insurance is interesting in and of itself.  
There are at least thirteen kinds of automobile insurance.95  Individual 
states’ political processes and investigations have apparently led 
legislatures to reach very different conclusions as to the appropriate 
type of policy, minimum policy limits, methods of enforcement, and 
 
87. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 73–78.  
88. AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84, at 3; 
Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 75.  
89. AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84, at 2–3. 
90. Id. at 5–9. 
91. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 61. 
92. Id. at 62. 
93. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 88. 
94. See, e.g., AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84, 
at 5, 7; LYN HUNSTAD, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CHARACTERISTICS OF UNINSURED MOTORIST 
1–2 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studies-
reports/0600-research-studies/auto-policy-studies/upload/Characteristics-of-Uninsured-
Motorist.pdf. 
95. Types of Auto Insurance Coverage, AUTOINSURANCE.ORG, 
http://www.autoinsurance.org/types-of-auto-insurance-coverage/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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range of penalties in its mandatory insurance requirements.96  The 
variety of mandated insurance among states ranges from no 
requirement at all for those who have not previously had an accident in 
which they were at fault to no-fault coverage.97 
Basic liability insurance is the most commonly mandated auto 
coverage, which covers damages to another’s property caused by the 
driver of the insured auto.98  It does not repair or replace the auto driven 
by the insured.99  The two general components of liability insurance are 
categorized in the industry as bodily injury and property damage.100  
State laws also specify a minimum amount of coverage as a three-digit 
series, stating the amount of coverage for personal injury per person, 
maximum personal injury for all injured, and property damage.101 
Mandatory minimums range (in thousands) from $12.5/$25/$7.5 in Ohio 
to $50/$100/$25 in Maine.102  
In so-called “no-fault states,” a trend in the 1970s that has largely 
been reversed, owners purchase auto insurance that provides coverage 
for their own vehicle, its driver, and passengers, regardless of who was at 
fault in the accident.103  Today, many no-fault states mandate that auto 
owners maintain insurance coverage, even though it applies only to their 
own vehicle rather than another driver’s.104  Uninsured or underinsured 
motorist auto insurance (UM/UMI) covers damages and losses of 
 
96. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
97. For an interesting comparison of the requirement to carry UM/UMI or no-fault auto 
insurance with the Affordable Care Act’s tax levied against the uninsured, see Jennifer B. 
Wriggins, Is the Health Insurance Individual Mandate “Unprecedented”?: The Case of Auto 
Insurance Mandates (Apr. 6, 2012) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011025. 
98. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 24, at 2; Compulsory 
Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77 (“Virtually all states require drivers to have auto 
liability insurance before they can legally drive a motor vehicle.”). 
99. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 24, at 2 (comparing 
“[l]iability” with “[c]ollision coverage” and “[c]omprehensive coverage”). 
100. Id. 
101. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77; see also, e.g., WIS. STAT. 
§ 344.01(2)(d) (2011–2012) (requiring Wisconsin drivers to have insurance covering $25,000 
for personal injury per person, $50,000 for personal injury of all people injured, and $10,000 
for property damage). 
102. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77. 
103. No-fault insurance was instituted in a number of states during the 1970s, and was 
proposed and tried as a response to concerns on tort litigation.  See Harrington, supra note 70, 
at 116; No-Fault Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/no-fault-auto-insurance.html. 
104. Harrington, supra note 70, at 116. 
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vehicle owners who suffer personal injury or property damage due to 
the fault of an uninsured or underinsured motorist.105  Some twenty-one 
states require vehicle owners to maintain UM/UMI insurance in 
addition to liability, in effect compelling the purchase of self-insurance 
for those vehicles in such circumstances.106 
Likewise, states chose a wide range of enforcement tactics and 
penalties for noncompliance, from fines to impoundment or 
imprisonment.107  Insurance companies claim that the cost to states of 
enforcing these laws or of required reporting systems,108 ultimately 
passes to the insured through rate increases and higher registration and 
licensing fees.  Many states require proof of insurance for vehicle 
registration,109 but owners can easily drop the insurance once registration 
is complete, and short of direct communication with the insurance 
carrier itself, it is difficult or impossible for an enforcement officer to 
know if a vehicle’s coverage has lapsed.  Systems to monitor insurance 
coverage and enforce these laws cannot only be expensive, but if 
unreliable or out of date, can unnecessarily penalize those in full 
compliance.110 
C. The Disjunction Between FEMA’s IVINS Rule and State Insurance 
Mandates 
Despite its comment that vehicles must meet “the terms of state 
law” to be eligible for aid, in practice, FEMA does not appear to adopt 
the particular individual state law varieties of required insurance 
carriage, but simply requires proof of some form of liability insurance.111  
It is unclear whether it enforces this provision at all in the lone holdout 
on mandatory insurance, New Hampshire, which instead requires a 
financial responsibility payment only from those drivers who have been 
 
105. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 1. 
106. See Harrington, supra note 70, at 116; Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra 
note 77. 
107. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 615. 
108. See, e.g., Despite Compulsory Coverage Laws, Fight Against UMs Marches On, 
supra note 34; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, 
Says Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34. 
109. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 19, 25, 27 (noting that 
Alabama, Arkansas, and California, for example, all require proof of insurance upon vehicle 
registration). 
110. See Knauf, supra note 34. 
111. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program, 
supra note 23, at 15; Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23. 
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at fault in at least one accident within the state.112  It seems unlikely that 
the level of detail needed to be certain that an auto insurance policy 
both meets the state standards and is current—or was at the time of the 
disaster—is beyond what most FEMA aid application processing 
encompasses in the days and weeks following a major disaster. 
Industry experts and scholars have examined the effect of 
mandatory insurance auto laws over time, and most studies indicate they 
have little to no real impact on the number of uninsured drivers, though 
there are some mixed conclusions.  The industry has consistently 
opposed these laws; some industry publications quote executives’ 
conclusions that compulsory or mandatory auto insurance rules are not 
successful in reducing the number or percentages of uninsured vehicles 
on our roads.113  For example, Lynn Knauf, policy manager for the 
Alliance of American Insurers, states that “[m]andatory automobile 
insurance reporting programs have never been proven effective in 
reducing the percentage of uninsured drivers on the road.”114  The 
industry also complains that insurers bear the costs and burdens of 
complying with state regulations on insurance companies, particularly 
creation and maintenance of up-to-the-minute databases on policies in 
force.115  Laura Kotelman, PCI regional manager and senior counsel, 
agrees: “[C]ompulsory auto insurance laws do not prevent uninsured 
drivers from owning or operating a vehicle, and are frequently a 
harassment to responsible drivers who do maintain coverage.”116 
Other examinations of the impact of mandatory auto insurance 
reach somewhat conflicting conclusions.  A study attempting to 
 
112. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:20 (2012). 
113. Some industry analysts believe mandatory insurance laws actually punish insured 
drivers by increasing overall costs while having little effect on the number of insured vehicles.  
See Knauf, supra note 34.  Knauf explains: 
Worst of all, insured drivers end up “paying” in three ways: they pay for their own 
insurance protection (which includes protection in the event of an accident caused 
by an uninsured driver); they pay increased insurance costs; and they often pay 
higher registration and licensing fees as the exorbitant costs of these mandatory 
insurance enforcement programs are ultimately passed to them.   
Id.  Knauf was the policy manager of the Alliance of American Insurers at the time of her 
statement.  Id. 
114. Knauf, supra note 34. 
115. Id.; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, 
Says Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34. 
116. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says 
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34. 
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correlate severity of possible penalties for noncompliance with 
improvements in compliance rates found a positive correlation between 
stiff penalties and compliance.117  One study found a correlation between 
more stringent enforcement of mandatory insurance laws and lower 
levels of uninsured motorist claims.118  The same study found support for 
the corresponding theory that states with more lax laws have higher 
levels of uninsured motorists, but also found demographic and price 
factors to be an influence.119  Another found that states with mandatory 
insurance laws may experience reduced levels of uninsured motorists, 
but also found that these drivers have an increased rate of involvement 
in auto accident fatalities, which it attributes to a “moral hazard” effect 
(the insured’s expectation of lower accident costs).120  At least one 
insurance economist doubts whether the overall effect of such laws 
actually reduce the costs of auto accidents overall.121 
More severe penalties do not necessarily translate to higher 
compliance with these laws either.  A Tulsa, Oklahoma journalist 
reported that after his state increased penalties and imposed towing and 
impoundment for uninsured vehicles, there was no significant effect on 
the number of uninsured motorists, and the rate remained one of the 
highest in the country at 23.9%.122  His source, IRC vice president David 
Corum, said the rate “appear[ed] to be related to the . . . economy.”123  
Several states have or are experimenting with different approaches to 
the problem of uninsured motorists, at least implicitly conceding that 
the present mandatory laws are not satisfactorily addressing the 
concern.124  At best, these studies raise serious questions about the 
 
117. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 631–36.  One flaw with this study noted by the author is 
the use of “average” penalties for violations of mandatory insurance laws.  Id.  For example, 
most people would acknowledge that a range of possible penalties from $100 to $5,000 is 
unlikely to result in an average penalty of $2,540 ($5,100÷2) per infraction. 
118. Yu-Luen Ma & Joan T. Schmit, Factors Affecting the Relative Incidence of 
Uninsured Motorists Claims, 67 J. RISK & INS. 281, 288 (2000). 
119. Id. at 287–88, 290. 
120. Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident 
Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360, 365, 373 (2004). 
121. Harrington, supra note 70, at 134.  
122. Omer Gillham, State’s Uninsured Drivers Still Rank High, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 
14, 2011, 8:07 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=201
10914_11_A13_CUTLIN385388. 
123. Id. 
124. Cassandra R. Cole & Kathleen A. McCullough, A Review of Some Possible 
Solutions to the Uninsured Motorist Problem, CPCU EJOURNAL (Nov. 2007), 
available at http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41179f63-2406-4460-
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effectiveness of mandatory insurance laws to prevent uncompensated 
damage and injuries, and brings into question whether any purpose is 
served by FEMA’s punitive actions postdisaster. 
D. Does the Insurance Mandate Discriminate Against Low Income 
Survivors? 
While there may be differences of opinion as to the value of 
mandatory auto insurance laws, there is no question that low- and 
moderate-income drivers comprise most of the ranks of uninsured 
motorists.  These demographics have been consistent over time.  In the 
IRC’s profile of uninsured motorists developed from a survey in 1989, it 
found that motorists most likely to be uninsured were young, with low 
education, and renting their residences.125  Significantly, it also found 
that motorists who earned less than $7,500 per year owned 23% of 
registered vehicles, but accounted for 50% of uninsured vehicles.126  The 
next level of those with incomes between $7,500 and $20,000 accounted 
for another 22% of uninsured motorists.127  Motorists with $20,000 or 
more in annual income owned 34% of registered vehicles but accounted 
for only 16% of uninsured vehicles.128  Lyn Hunstad conducted a survey 
for the California Department of Insurance, published in 1999, and 
found almost identical demographics.129  In 2000, Khazzoom summarized 
a number of sources of information on uninsured motorists130 and 
reported that uninsured motorists are most likely to be young, low-
income, minority males with low levels of education, most likely rent 
rather than own a home, to be unemployed or work part-time, and drive 
older model cars.131  They are also more likely to have been involved in 
accidents,132 which is likely to lead to more expensive insurance 
 
9988-7288bd7de83b%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=114 (subscription required).  A number 
of other methods of addressing the problem of uninsured vehicles have been proposed, 
including improvement of tracking and enforcement, low-cost auto policies, uninsured 
motorist coverage, so-called “no-pay, no-play” laws which preclude uninsured drivers from 
collecting for damages from insured drivers, and pay-at-the-pump strategies.  Id. 
125. ALL-INDUS. RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 29, 30 
tbls.17, 18, 19 (1989).  
126. Id. at 31 tbl.21.  
127. Id. 
128. Id.  
129. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2. 
130. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 82–86. 
131. Id. at 85. 
132. Id.  Khazzoom’s data highlights the demographics of uninsured motorists: 
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premiums. 
A direct correlation alone does not necessarily mean that there is a 
causal effect between low-income drivers and lack of insurance.  
Inquiries and surveys seeking to discover why motorists do not insure 
their vehicles attempt to answer the question.  Virtually every study of 
uninsured motorists leads to the same conclusion: people do not insure 
their vehicles for two primary reasons.133  First, they do not, or rarely, 
use the vehicle, or second, they cannot afford insurance.134  According to 
the IRC, over 80% of the owners of uninsured vehicles gave one of 
these reasons—41% citing nonuse and 41% citing inability to pay and 
 
Table 4 Profile of Uninsured Motorists  
Age: Young Motorists between 18–29 own 28 percent of registered 
vehicles.  Account for 52 percent of uninsured vehicles.  Motorists 45 and 
over own 39 percent of registered vehicles.  Account for 13 percent of 
uninsured vehicles.  
Education: Low Motorists with less than a high school education own 
17 percent of reg. vehicles.  Account for 33 percent of uninsured vehicles. 
College grad or post grads own 23 percent of registered vehicles.  Account 
for 11 percent of uninsured vehicles.  
Residence: Rent Motorists renting residence own 26 percent of reg. 
vehicles.  Account for 50 percent of uninsured vehicles.  Motorists owning 
residence own 68 percent of reg. vehicles.  Account for 40 percent of 
uninsured vehicles.  
Job Status: Unemployed[/]Part-time Unemployed Motorists own 17 
percent of registered vehicles.  Account for 33 percent of uninsured 
vehicles.  Retired motorists own 14 percent of registered vehicles.  
Account for 5 percent of uninsured vehicles.  
Personal Inc[ome]: Low Motorists with less than $7500 own 23 
percent of reg. vehicles.  Account for 40 percent of uninsured vehicles.  
Motorists with $20,000 or more own 34 percent of reg. vehicles.  Account 
for 16 percent of uninsured vehicles.  
Gender: Mostly Male One estimate for CA showed 70 percent of 
[uninsured motorists] are male.  
Car Age: Old [One e]xample from Texas[ showed] 58 percent drive 
cars more than 10 years old.   
Ethnic: Minority Percent varies by state; [minorities] dominant in 
some [states,] such as CA, TX. 
Driving Record: Evidence [of] Accident Proneness In 1990, CA 
percent [of uninsured motorists] was less than 28 percent; yet CHP data for 
[1988–1989 show that 55.1–60.9 percent of fatal accidents, 44.6 percent of 
bodily injury accidents, and 34.1 percent of traffic citations involved 
uninsured motorists]. 
Id. at 85 tbl.4 (formatting omitted). 
133. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88. 
134. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88. 
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high costs.135  Arguably, vehicles that are not on the roads or highways 
are not involved in accidents, and do not contribute to the problem of 
uncompensated damage.  Without these vehicles, the pool of uninsured 
drivers who plead inability to pay becomes much larger.  In fact, if the 
unused vehicles are removed from the pool, nearly 70% of uninsured 
drivers who are using their vehicles claim to be unable to purchase 
insurance.136  Of course, this number would be enhanced by those who 
may have simply elected not to have an automobile at all because they 
either cannot afford insurance or are deterred by the risk of penalties 
for failure to comply with the law.  Industry studies and predictions also 
indicate that unemployment is a determinative factor in the uninsured 
auto rate, anticipating increases during recent years of economic 
hardship nationwide.137  Both the Insurance Industry Institute and the 
IRC warned in 2009 that economic downturn and financial hardships 
would increase the percentage of uninsured vehicles.138 
Economist Scott Harrington points out the rationality of low-income 
drivers’ failure to insure.139  There are few benefits for an investment in 
liability insurance for a poor family, in large part because insurance’s 
purpose is to compensate others, not the insured.  Low-income owners 
are less likely to own a home or have other significant assets, making the 
risk of the levy of a collectible judgment for damage to another’s car far 
less likely.140  Many uninsured autos are older makes and models,141 so 
insuring them comprehensively or against collision is less advantageous.  
If injured, Medicaid likely covers low-income parties’ hospital and 
medical costs.142  All in all, the risks of being uninsured are so low as to 
 
135. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 5 (“The primary reasons given for not insuring the 
vehicle were: vehicle not in operating condition (24%), [cannot] afford to buy it (21%), 
premiums were too high (20%), and vehicle runs but is not being used (17%).”); Khazzoom, 
supra note 79, at 87–88. 
136. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88. 
137. News Release, Ins. Research Council, Economic Downturn May 
Push  Percentage  of  Uninsured  Motorists  to  All-Time High (Jan. 
21,  2009)  [hereinafter  News  Release],  available at http://www.insurance-
research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/IRC_UM_012109.pdf. 
138. I.I.I. Sees More Uninsured Drivers as Financial Hardships Loom, INS. ADVOC., Feb. 
23, 2009, at 14–15; News Release, supra note 137. 
139. Harrington, supra note 70, at 119–20. 
140. Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Households and the Auto 
Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450. 
141. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 6. 
142. Harrington, supra note 70, at 116. 
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justify that economic choice.143 
To further complicate matters, the Consumer Federation of America 
(CFA)144 concluded in a study released in January 2012 that the auto 
insurance rates reflect disparate treatment and impacts on low-to-
middle income (LMI) individuals.145  It estimates that perhaps as many 
as one-fifth to one-third of low-to-middle income households—defined 
as earning $20,000 or less per year and $40,000 or less, respectively— do 
not have auto insurance and are operating their vehicles illegally.146  
Insurance companies are forbidden to use income as a rating factor for 
those seeking insurance, but the authors of this study determined that 
proxies for income have become more prevalent, permitting indirect 
discrimination on the basis of wealth.147  Among other practices 
discovered that militate against LMI drivers obtaining insurance are the 
lack of access by lower income families to insurance agencies and 
offices;148 inability to purchase insurance from some major insurers;149 
being charged higher premiums for less coverage;150 being charged 
 
143. Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 120, at 361 (citing, e.g. Gur Huberman et al., Optimal 
Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules, 14 BELL J. ECON. 415 (1983)); Brobeck & Hunter, 
supra note 140 (noting that liability insurance provides “little if any direct benefit[]”). 
144. About CFA: Overview, CONSUMER FED’N AM., 
http://www.consumerfed.org/about-cfa/overview (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (explaining that 
“The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is an association of nonprofit consumer 
organizations that was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, 
advocacy, and education.  Today, nearly 300 of these groups participate in the federation and 
govern it through their representatives on the organization’s Board of Directors.”). 
145. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140; CFA Releases Study on Economic Harm to 
LMI Households from Over Price Auto Insurance, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/451. 
146. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
Research suggests that those in LMI urban communities have much less access to 
auto insurance offices than do those in higher-income areas.  For example, in the 
District of Columbia, of [eighty] insurance offices identified, only three were located 
in the two wards with the lowest incomes while [forty-five] were located in the two 
wards with the highest incomes.   
Id.  
149. Id.  “Some major insurers will not even sell auto insurance to certain types of car 
owners” or they charge rates that are so much higher than those of most other insurers that 
they clearly are not serious about selling these policies.  Id. 
150. Id.  In at least several states including Arizona, Texas, and Arkansas, and probably 
in more, “some major insurers charge [individual consumers] lower premiums for standard 
[liability coverage] than for minimum liability coverage.  It appears that these insurers are 
discriminating against purchasers of the minimum coverage, who are disproportionately LMI 
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higher premiums because of rating factors beyond their control such as 
age, gender, and zip code;151 being charged higher premiums because key 
rating factors are largely ignored;152 being charged very high premiums 
for force placed coverage;153 and being treated unfairly in the claims 
process.154 
Combining the information to consider the effects on the willingness 
and ability of low-income auto owners to purchase auto liability 
insurance, we can see a disturbing confluence of problems.  The reasons 
for lack of compliance with the laws are many, and the cost is one of the 
most problematic.  Liability insurance ranges from around $700 to 
thousands per year.155  Possible discrimination against the poor only 
exacerbates that effect.  As a result of all of these factors, those with 
vehicles of relatively little value and few assets have little incentive to 
incur the expense of auto insurance. 
III. STAFFORD ACT PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC STATUS 
DISCRIMINATION AND FEMA’S IVINS RULE 
Economic discrimination in conducting disaster response policy and 
 
car owners.”  Id. 
151. Id. 
In general, LMI car owners are disadvantaged by rate classification systems used by 
insurers.  They pay higher premiums because insurers use rating factors, such as 
[location of] residence, occupation, education, and credit rating, which [they claim] 
are often correlated with risk.  But insurers often have not adequately demonstrated 
to regulators that these correlations exist or that they actually [adequately] reflect 
risk . . . . 
Id.  Some of these factors, individually and in aggregate, may be “surrogates for income,” a 
factor forbidden from use in all states.  Id. 
152. Id.  “One important factor” not adequately taken into account by rating systems, to 
the detriment of LMI families, is miles driven annually.  Id.  “LMI car owners drive far fewer 
miles annually than do higher-income owners—about half the miles of those in the top 
income quintile but the lower risks associated with fewer miles driven are not adequately 
recognized by rating systems.”  Id. 
153. Id.  “Collision and comprehensive coverage purchased by auto lenders for 
borrowers without this coverage is . . . expensive because, as they do for most types of credit 
insurance[,]” lenders charge insurers large commissions that effectively represent 
“kickbacks.”  Id.  “These commissions are the main reason that, according to one study, loss 
ratios on forced place coverage [the percentage of premiums dollars paid out in claims] 
averaged [twenty-five] percent, well below the industry average of more than [sixty] percent.”  
Id. 
154. Id.  “To quote one plaintiff’s attorney who used to work for insurers, ‘it’s easier [to 
deny claims to] the sick, the weak, and the poor than [to] someone who is big and tough.’”  Id. 
155. Id. 
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actions is expressly prohibited in the Stafford Act.156  Concerns about 
how low-income individuals and families might fare in disaster situations 
appear in the legislative history of the federal disaster response at least 
as early as 1973.157  In a report to Congress at that time from a special 
taskforce appointed to revamp the Disaster Preparedness Act under the 
Nixon administration, the authors make clear a concern that the 
“needy” are especially vulnerable to disaster and may not qualify for 
disaster loans available to those of more means.158  The legislative 
history of federal disaster legislation continues to reflect this concern.159  
The result is expressly evident in 42 U.S.C. § 5151, where economic 
status is given equal weight with protections for discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, and national origin.160  The statement is repeated in 
FEMA’s regulations, providing that aid requests and responses shall be 
accomplished without discrimination on the grounds of “race, color, 
religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or 
economic status,” similar language has appeared in disaster response 
legislation since the 1970s.161  If data supports the premise that a policy 
requiring liability auto insurance discriminates against those of low and 
moderate income, FEMA’s insurance requirement may well violate this 
provision. 
A. Possible Challenges to the Mandatory Liability Insurance 
Requirement by FEMA 
FEMA has acknowledged that, in its own words, “people who are 
economically disadvantaged will always be more in need of federal 
disaster assistance,” but made the point that this inevitable fact does not 
mean its actions are discriminatory.162  To date, it appears that no court 
 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
157. See, e.g., To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief 
Legislation Part 5, supra note 50, 168 (statement of George M. Elsey, President, American 
National Red Cross). 
158. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-100, at 12 (1973). 
159. See supra notes 42–62 and accompanying text. 
160. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a). 
161. Id.; see Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 311, 88 Stat. 143, 150 
(“[R]elief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial 
manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or 
economic status.”).  
162. McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters II), 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(quoting Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 3, McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (No. 05-5488), 
2006 WL 703656, which reads: “[P]eople who are economically disadvantaged will always be 
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has found that any FEMA policy or decision is in violation of its 
nondiscrimination provision. 
An individual or group, or more likely a pro bono organization on its 
behalf, who wishes to have FEMA alter or reconsider the auto insurance 
qualification, would face a number of legal hurdles.  A court action 
would first face jurisdictional and immunity issues.163  Sovereign 
immunity, as any law student can explain, prevents legal action against 
government actors unless the government has expressly given its 
consent to be subject to review,164 and a suit against any federal agency 
or a federal official acting in an official capacity is a suit against the 
sovereign.165  Furthermore, FEMA is protected by a Stafford Act 
provision that articulates its own nonliability protection.166  Section 5148 
of the Act states that the government “shall not be liable for any claim 
based upon the [agency’s] exercise or performance of, or a failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”167  The identical 
language appears in its regulations.168  Stated in the affirmative, the 
provision asserts protection from liability for agency actions in carrying 
out discretionary functions.169 
A review of recent cases suggests the government has taken a very 
broad view of what FEMA actions are “discretionary” so as to fall 
within the protections, at times arguing that FEMA has a unique 
position due to its particular mission and claiming a different standard 
 
more affected by a disaster than other persons, and will always be more in need of federal 
disaster assistance”). 
163. See generally Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 941 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
164. See generally DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF 
LAW: THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 79–80 (2005). 
Sovereign immunity in the United States today has two functions.  First, it 
disables individuals (wholly or partially) from seeking relief from a governmental 
entity for unlawful harm done or threatened. . . .   
Second, the Supreme Court has instructed that sovereign immunity upholds the 
dignity interest of a sovereign in not being summoned either into its own courts or 
into the courts of some other sovereign. 
Id. 
165. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. 44 C.F.R. § 206.9 (2011). 
169. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (“This provision ‘preclude[s] 
judicial review of all disaster relief claims based upon the discretionary actions of federal 
employees.’” (quoting Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987))). 
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of discretionary acts than that applied to other federal agency actions 
operating with similarly functioning protections.170 
Several courts have had the opportunity to consider challenges to 
FEMA decisions, practices, and policies under various theories of 
liability and with consideration of a government immunity defense.171  
The most likely sources of authority for judicial review of the mandatory 
insurance provision are: (1) violation of FEMA’s statutory provisions; 
(2) the Administrative Procedures Act; or (3) constitutional violations.172  
Examination of each of these theories and the guidance and rules 
emerging from courts addressing individuals’ challenges to FEMA 
action (or inaction) is instructive in determining the parameters of 
jurisdiction and standards of review applied to this particular agency’s 
policies and practices. 
B. The Scope of FEMA Nonliability 
The Stafford Act provides that the government “shall not be liable 
for any claim based upon the [agency’s] exercise or performance of, or a 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”173  
Courts are directed to consider the nature of the activity carried out by 
the agency or its agent, not the identity of the actor, in determining 
whether a particular challenge is appropriate for judicial review.174  What 
constitutes a “discretionary function or duty” establishes the parameters 
for the judicial jurisdiction over nonmonetary challenges to FEMA.175  
Like other agencies, the basic parameters of FEMA’s sovereign 
immunity protect it not only from liability, but from the requirement of 
defending its actions at all.176  Procedurally, these become 
determinations of whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain the 
action claim heard as a motion to dismiss.177  Defining what is 
 
170. See, e.g., Graham, 149 F.3d at 1006. 
171. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (addressing constitutional 
violations); St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 318 (5th Cir. 2009) (alleging 
violations of FEMA’s statutory provisions); Graham, 149 F.3d at 1000 (suing under the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
172. See, e.g., supra note 171.  
173. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (restated in 44 C.F.R. § 206.9). 
174. See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig 
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984). 
175. See, e.g., St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 317–18. 
176. Id. at 318. 
177. Id. at 315 n.3. 
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discretionary and what is not has been the cornerstone to jurisprudence 
assessing when a court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an agency 
action.178  Therefore, the essential initial inquiry in a request for judicial 
review of a FEMA policy, such as the auto liability insurance mandate, 
is whether it is a discretionary act to establish and enforce that eligibility 
requirement.179  If Congress granted FEMA that authority, a court 
cannot properly reach the merits of the claim.180 
1. FTCA Precedent and FEMA’s “Propinquity” Standard 
FEMA has aggressively asserted a broad interpretation of the 
nonliability immunity defense in motions to dismiss since the earliest 
challenges to its actions.181  Recently, it has taken the position that 
judicially created standards applied to other agencies under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), both long used as precedent, are inapplicable to it.182  
Moreover, FEMA contends that the Stafford Act intended a different 
definition of “discretionary” to apply to FEMA.183  So far, courts have 
declined to accept these arguments, but while the boundaries of 
FEMA’s nonliability provision have been addressed in district courts 
and certain courts of appeals, the holdings have not directly addressed 
the arguments and decisions have been limited to the facts of the cases 
 
178. Id. at 318–19. 
179. See, e.g., id. at 310. 
180. Id. at 326 n.13. 
181. See, e.g., Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998). 
182. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 313–14. 
183. Id. at 318–19; Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 380 (1983).  The Ornellas 
court relied on the following statement as evidence of Congress’s intent to bar all claims 
regarding disaster relief: 
 We have further provided that if the agencies of the Government make a 
mistake in the administration of the Disaster Relief Act that the Government may 
not be sued.  Strange as it may seem, there are many suits pending in the Court of 
Claims today against the Government because of alleged mistakes made in the 
administration of other relief acts, suits . . . because citizens have averred that the 
agencies and employees of Government made mistakes.  We have put a stipulation 
in here that there shall be no liability on the part of the Government. 
Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11,912 (1950) (statement of Rep. 
Whittington)).  The statement came from debates regarding the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, 
in which the discretionary function exception first appeared.  See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, 
Pub. L. No. 81-875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109, 1110.  The court took this statement to mean Congress 
“inten[ded] to raise a statutory barrier to judicial review.”  Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380. 
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before the courts.184  Consequently, this argument may continue to 
appear in subsequent FEMA litigation.185 
The government first took this unprecedented position in 2006 post-
Hurricane Katrina litigation.  It objected to the use of FTCA analysis to 
determine what constituted discretion given to an agency by Congress, 
claiming that FEMA’s unique mission to respond to disaster required 
application of a unique standard.186  The government asserted that 
FEMA’s immunity from suit was not coterminous with that proscribed 
under the FTCA, and that it should be subject to a different—
 presumably much broader—standard of “propinquity” to the 
disaster or emergency.187  “Propinquity,” defined by Merriam-Webster 
as “nearness in place; proximity . . . nearness in time,”188 would require 
courts to take into consideration the context of disaster response 
decisions.  The government contended that the Stafford Act vests the 
United States with full discretion in its provision of disaster assistance, 
leaving the courts only to determine whether the conduct complained of 
occurred in the course of carrying out the agency’s charge.189  If the court 
agreed, FEMA would not be subject to judicial review for any actions 
taken in conducting disaster relief.190  FEMA made the argument 
simultaneously in two cases pending in the Fifth Circuit, although in 
both cases it first raised the issue on appeal.191  The government, though 
it acknowledged that the plain language of the statute limited immunity 
to “discretionary function[s] or dut[ies],” took the position that 
Congress intended FEMA to have a far greater, basically unfettered, 
immunity from judicial review than other agencies when acting in 
response to a disaster.192 
The Fifth Circuit claimed that it would not address the argument 
 
184. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
185. Id. at 188. 
186. Id. at 195–97.     
187. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319. 
188. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1551 (2011). 
189. Brief for Appellees at 10–11, St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d 307 (No. 08-30070), 
2008 WL 6122721 (“[T]he essential inquiry for the court is whether the actions (or inactions) 
complained of occurred in the course of ‘carrying out the provisions of [the Stafford Act].’  If 
it does, sovereign immunity should bar the claim.” (citation omitted)). 
190. Id. at 11.  
191. Id.; St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319 n.7; see also Freeman v. United States, 556 
F.3d 326, 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2009). 
192. Brief for Appellees, supra note 189, at 10–11. 
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since it had not been made to the trial court, but made clear that it did 
not agree to adopt a new standard.193  The opinion in St. Tammany 
Parish declined to directly address the statutory interpretations relied 
on by the government to support its new interpretation of § 5148, but 
dismissed the government’s merits by holding that “discretionary 
function or duty” has the same meaning in both the Stafford Act and the 
FTCA. 194  The opinion quotes the identical relevant language of the two 
provisions,195 the legislative history evidencing that Congress intended to 
adopt the FTCA standard, and other courts of appeals applying the 
FTCA case law in FEMA cases.196  It found no difference in application 
to the case before it or reason to depart from the traditional analysis.197  
The decision comports with every court to date that has addressed 
FEMA’s defense of protection under the “discretionary action” 
exception by applying the standard and precedent developed in 
interpretations of the FTCA.198  The circuits that have addressed this 
issue have expressly used this standard, and none has rejected it.199  
Plaintiffs can be relatively confident that they will continue to do so, 
despite any novel arguments to the contrary from the government. 
2. Administrative Procedures Act Application 
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) has also been relied 
upon by those seeking injunctive or other nonmonetary relief from 
FEMA.200  As it did specifically in the Stafford Act for FEMA, Congress 
generally waived sovereign immunity for nondiscretionary agency action 
via a 1976 amendment to the APA.201  According to § 701(a) of the 
APA, federal agencies’ actions or inactions are subject to judicial review 
 
193. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319 n.7. 
194. Id. at 319. 
195. Id. at 320 (“Compare [42 U.S.C.] § 5148 (exempting claims based on ‘the exercise or 
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty’), with 
[28 U.S.C.] § 2680(a) (exempting claims based on ‘the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty’).”). 
196. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 320. 
197. Id. 
198. E.g., id. at 320 & n.8.  The FTCA statute was originally enacted as Title IV of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–42, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47, 
and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
199. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319–20. 
200. E.g., City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
201. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 702–703 (2006)). 
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unless “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”202  In practical effect, the statute 
creates a parallel to FEMA’s and FTCA’s provisions, and, again, results 
in the need for a court to consider whether the agency action was 
“discretionary” before affirming its jurisdiction.203 
The government has also disputed jurisdiction for judicial review of 
FEMA activity via the APA, claiming that FEMA falls within the 
exception created in part one of § 701(a).204  It argued in McWaters v. 
FEMA (McWaters II) that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
does not apply to FEMA because § 5148 of the Stafford Act acts 
independently to “preclude judicial review” of the actions about which 
plaintiffs complained.205  No court has specifically reached the issue, yet, 
of whether the parameters of the APA and FEMA are completely 
coterminous, but one federal district court held that, having determined 
that the functions and duties rendered by FEMA under the Stafford Act 
were “discretionary” pursuant to its § 5148, the APA was inapplicable.206  
Given the precedent on the application of FTCA immunity analysis to 
FEMA, and the fact that the two standards are so similar in meaning, it 
seems very unlikely that a court would find that a different standard 
applied to determining whether a FEMA action was discretionary under 
the APA as opposed to the Stafford Act.  If those definitions remain the 
same, plaintiffs need not attempt to rely on the APA, and the pursuit of 
a claim under the APA is simply redundant in regard to the treatment of 
discretionary acts, though it may have application elsewhere in a 
challenge to a FEMA process. 
Moreover, before a court can consider whether an action challenged 
pursuant to the APA is discretionary, the decision must be “final” in 
order to be reviewed in the courts.207  Until a final agency action has 
 
202. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006). 
203. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (E.D. La. 2006). 
204. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, McWaters 
II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (No. 05-5488), 2006 WL 638603. 
205. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
206. Id. 
207. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).  Section 704 reads: 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.  A 
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly 
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.  Except as 
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the 
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been undertaken, the agency presumably still has authority to resolve 
the matter, leaving a court without jurisdiction.208  FEMA used this 
rationale to assert in some actions that plaintiffs must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before seeking a court’s review.209 
In Lockett v. FEMA, the government asserted a “failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies” defense, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims 
were not final because they had not appealed their individual decisions 
pursuant to the Stafford Act.210  The Lockett court found that, unlike 
many other agencies, the Stafford Act provides FEMA applicants with 
only an informal procedure and permissive opportunity for appeals with 
no formal adjudication or process for review.211  It relied on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Darby v. Cisneros,212 which explained 
that an agency may avoid the finality of an initial administrative decision 
only if it satisfies dual factors.  The agency must have adopted a rule 
that an appeal be taken before judicial review is available and the rule 
must provide that the initial decision is inoperative pending appeal.213  
Otherwise, the initial decision becomes final and the aggrieved party is 
entitled to judicial review.214  Because the Stafford Act’s appeal 
procedure does neither,215 exhaustion of remedies is not required before 
seeking court review of an initial FEMA denial.216 
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO 
THE FEMA’S IVINS RULE 
A. Discretionary Act? 
Presumably, under current case law, a court entertaining an action 
against FEMA would apply the well-established test stated in Berkovitz 
 
purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an 
application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the 
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is 
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.   
Id. 
208. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2008). 
209. See, e.g., Lockett v. FEMA, 836 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
210. Id. at 851–52. 
211. Id. at 853. 
212. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993).  
213. Lockett, 836 F. Supp. at 852–53. 
214. Id. at 853. 
215. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.101(m)(1) (2011). 
216. Lockett, 836 F. Supp. at 853. 
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v. United States to determine what actions, practices, and policies fall 
within its discretionary activities.217  In Berkovitz, the Court established a 
two-pronged approach for this determination.218  First, the court 
examines whether a “choice or judgment” is involved in the 
performance of the agency function, and looks to see if that choice or 
judgment is “not tempered by a statute, regulation or policy which 
mandates a particular course of action.”219  If agency action is 
constrained in some fashion, it is mandatory, not discretionary, and not 
immune from suit.220  If the first prong is satisfied, then a second prong 
questions whether the activity in question is grounded in social, 
economic, or political activity.221  If the second prong is also satisfied, the 
agency had discretionary authority over the decision, and its action is 
outside the waiver of sovereign immunity and not subject to judicial 
review.222 
For guidance, a frequently relied upon United States Supreme Court 
case clarifying and summing up the application of the Berkovitz 
standard is found in United States v. Gaubert.223  The Gaubert court 
articulated the purpose of the discretionary function exception as 
intended to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political 
policy through the medium of an action in tort.”224  The Court clarified 
that not only did the challenged act involved need to be nonmandatory, 
but that even discretionary actions must clearly satisfy the second 
Berkovitz prong and be “grounded in the policy of the regulatory 
regime,” in order to escape the waiver of sovereign immunity provided 
by the discretionary function exception.225  The scrutiny suggested in this 
inquiry is tempered, however, by a presumption that an agency’s or an 
agent’s acts are grounded in policy whenever exercising the discretion 
 
217. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
218. Id. at 536–37. 
219. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. La. 2006) (citing Berkovitz, 486 
U.S. at 536–37). 
220. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544. 
221. Id. at 537; see also McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
222. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812. 
223. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991). 
224. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense 
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)). 
225. Id. at 325, 328–29. 
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granted by Congress.226 
To analyze whether a court might view the policy decision of 
mandatory auto liability insurance by FEMA as a discretionary function, 
a court would first consider the statute and regulations regarding 
“financial assistance . . . to address . . . other necessary expenses or 
serious needs,” under which aid for transportation falls, to see if a 
“judgment or choice” is involved.227  Case law makes clear that there is 
no question that decisions to grant or deny disaster aid pursuant to 
FEMA policy are discretionary.228  FEMA’s statutes give it the authority 
to establish eligibility standards and to make determinations of who 
meets its established criteria.229  The Stafford Act provisions pertaining 
to individual and household aid are replete with the language of 
discretion.230  The lacing of aid provisions with permissive language has 
led courts to frequently characterize awards of disaster financial 
assistance from FEMA as “gratuitous.”231  As the Ninth Circuit held, 
“decisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited 
governmental resources are the type of administrative judgment that the 
discretionary function exception was designed to immunize from suit.”232  
The provision or withholding of virtually every FEMA benefit has been 
deemed a discretionary act, and immune from suit.233 
If the question of FEMA’s insurance policy is reframed from 
whether it has discretion to use liability insurance as a criterion to 
whether it has the authority to do so without notice and comment 
rulemaking, the analysis looks more promising.  Stated differently, does 
FEMA have the discretion to include this policy in its decision factors 
without formal regulations and rules procedures, or is that process 
“mandatory,” and hence, beyond the protection of the § 5148 immunity? 
Though most of the Stafford Act’s aid provisions are written in 
 
226. Id. at 324. 
227. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Berkovitz v. United States., 
486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
228. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013–14 (N.D. Cal. 2001); 
Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998); see also supra note 20 (highlighting the 
President’s delegation of powers to FEMA).  
229. 42 U.S.C. § 5174; see also City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
230. 42 U.S.C. § 5174; see also City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
231. See, e.g., Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 380 (1983). 
232. Graham, 149 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th 
Cir. 1998)). 
233. See id. 
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permissive terms, giving the President and his authorized agents the 
option to act or to make determinations of functions and process, a few 
provisions give no such choice.  Two statutory provisions could possibly 
be implicated in a challenge to the auto insurance mandate, either 
§ 5174(j)’s directive to promulgate rules and regulations regarding 
eligibility standards234 or § 5151(a)’s instruction to do the same to protect 
against discrimination on the basis of economic status in the granting of 
aid.235  Each includes requirements that regulations “shall” be made, and 
§ 5151 states the regulations “shall” include provisions that relief and 
assistance are provided in a nondiscriminatory manner.236  Generally, 
agencies are directed by Congress to implement such rules and 
regulations as are needed to effectuate their missions and must proceed 
through the formal rulemaking process set out in the Administrative 
Procedures Act.237  Central to the APA’s functioning is the requirement 
of public notice and the opportunity for public comment.238  The auto 
insurance eligibility requirement, binding on disaster survivor 
applicants, was not promulgated and vetted in this fashion.239 
A district court in southern Texas was presented this question in 
regard to regulations governing aid for housing repair, challenged by 
plaintiffs as vague, and generally insufficient to satisfy the rulemaking 
mandates.240  In La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, the court 
distinguished the provisions in the nondiscrimination statute, § 5151, 
from those in the eligibility for aid statute, § 5174.241  It found the 
regulatory mandate in § 5151 to be discretionary, noting that despite the 
“shall issue” language, the mandate is tempered by the language that 
references only “such regulations as may be necessary for the guidance 
of personnel.”242  Read as a whole, the court found that the section 
provides that as such regulations are made, they shall include provisions 
to assure the assistance is accomplished in a nondiscriminatory 
 
234. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j). 
235. § 5151(a).  
236. §§ 5151, 5174. 
237. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
238. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 35–41. 
240. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, No. B 08 487, 2009 WL 1346030, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. May 13, 2009), vacated, 608 F.3d 217, 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2010). 
241. Id. at *7; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5151(a), 5174(j). 
242. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *4, *6–8; 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) 
(emphasis added).  
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manner.243  It is questionable whether the regulations adopted to enact 
§ 5151 actually provide methods of ensuring that FEMA activities do 
not discriminate.244  Instead, they provide assurances that the agency will 
not discriminate, and will create policies it “shall make available to 
employees, applicants, participants, beneficiaries, and other interested 
parties” information on “this regulation and its applicability to the 
programs or activities conducted by the agency” in “such manner as the 
head of the agency finds necessary.”245  Still, the agency did enact 
regulations in some manner, and a court would likely be reluctant to 
find that the vagueness was so deficient as to have failed to comply with 
the regulation mandate. 
The La Union del Pueblo Entero court contrasted the permissive 
language of the modifications of § 5151’s directive regarding the 
establishment of regulations with that of § 5174(j), which states 
unequivocally that “[t]he President shall prescribe rules and regulations 
to carry out this section [setting out various types of aid to individuals 
and households], including criteria, standards, and procedures for 
determining eligibility for assistance.”246  The trial court granted the 
 
243. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *4; 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a). 
244. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a); 44 C.F.R. § 206.11 (2011).  The relevant portion of 44 C.F.R. 
§ 206.11 reads:  
Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance. 
(a) Federal financial assistance to the States or their political subdivisions is 
conditioned on full compliance with 44 CFR part 7, Nondiscrimination in Federally-
Assisted Programs. 
(b) All personnel carrying out Federal major disaster or emergency assistance 
functions, including the distribution of supplies, the processing of the applications, 
and other relief and assistance activities, shall perform their work in an equitable 
and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, 
nationality, sex, age, or economic status. 
(c) As a condition of participation in the distribution of assistance or supplies 
under the Stafford Act, or of receiving assistance under the Stafford Act, 
government bodies and other organizations shall provide a written assurance of 
their intent to comply with regulations relating to nondiscrimination. 
(d) The agency shall make available to employees, applicants, participants, 
beneficiaries, and other interested parties such information regarding the provisions 
of this regulation and its applicability to the programs or activities conducted by the 
agency, and make such information available to them in such manner as the head of 
the agency finds necessary to apprise such persons of the protections against 
discrimination assured them by the Act and this regulation.   
Id.  
245. 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(d). 
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5151, 5174(j). 
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plaintiffs injunctive relief on this basis.247 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the decision, though it 
agreed entirely with the trial court as to the nature of the two statutes.248  
Rather, it found that the rules and regulations provided by FEMA 
pursuant to § 5174 were not so lacking as to ensure plaintiffs substantial 
likelihood on the merits, and consequently the matter was not 
appropriate for injunctive relief.249  Only if the court found the 
regulations “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute” 
would it have agreed with the trial court, noting that within limits, courts 
should grant deference to agency exercise of delegated powers.250 
The auto liability insurance requirement presents a somewhat 
different context.  The same mandatory provision of § 5174(j) applies to 
all individual and household aid, and creates the obligation to enact 
“rules and regulations” regarding the granting of aid to disaster 
survivors.251  Unlike the provisions of the Stafford Act at issue in La 
Union del Pueblo Entero, challenged on the basis that they were vague 
and unclear, and thus insufficient to satisfy the statute,252 the eligibility 
qualifications in regard to auto insurance requirements have never 
appeared at all in the Federal Register or the C.F.R.  They were never 
published for comment prior to their taking effect.  In that sense, a more 
applicable case law comparison might be MST Express v. Department of 
Transportation.253  By law, the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) was directed to prescribe by regulation the specific initial and 
continuing requirements for safety fitness.254  MST Express, a trucking 
company, claimed that the FHWA’s procedures for determining its 
“safety fitness rating” were unlawful because they “were not 
administered even-handedly and [were] therefore arbitrary and 
capricious.”255  FHWA countered that it had met its legal obligation and 
was not subject to the rulemaking requirements because it had merely 
 
247. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *10. 
248. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, 608 F.3d 217, 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2010). 
249. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j). 
250. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 608 F.3d at 223 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).  
251. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j). 
252. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 608 F.3d at 223.  
253. MST Express v. Dep’t of Transp., 108 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
254. Id. at 402; see 49 U.S.C. § 31144(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
255. MST Express, 108 F.3d at 401–02. 
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issued “interpretive rules.”256  The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that FHWA had not complied with its congressional 
directive to establish regulations for a differently stated reason: the 
agency had not established its rating via notice and comment 
rulemaking.  Accordingly, it vacated the decision of the FHWA on the 
basis of its informally established criteria.257 
Here, FEMA is similarly using a criterion that has not complied with 
its statutory directive to “prescribe rules and regulations” establishing 
the “criteria, standards, and procedures for determining eligibility for 
assistance.”258  Or, more accurately, it is enforcing a criterion for 
eligibility that is not among the regulations it did promulgate in its 
regulation, and the court held that conduct violated its obligations.259  If 
a court is persuaded that FEMA has not complied with this 
“mandatory” duty, it could invalidate the auto liability insurance 
mandate criteria to qualify for financial aid for a disaster-damaged 
vehicle. 
V. “ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO 
STATUTE,” OR AN “ABUSE OF DISCRETION”? 
A different approach in seeking judicial review could assert that the 
auto liability mandate prerequisite to transportation aid is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute,”260 which would permit a 
court to eradicate the use of that eligibility factor.  Under the APA, 
actions found “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law” will be set aside.261  The La Union del 
Pueblo Entero opinion by the Fifth Circuit made clear that while the 
regulations it reviewed were within the boundaries of the discretion of 
FEMA’s authority and challenges on lack of specificity are unlikely to 
be deemed acceptable, that discretion is not unbounded.262  Neither does 
the examination of the facts end by determining that FEMA had 
authority to set its eligibility policy.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
 
256. Id. at 405. 
257. Id. at 406. 
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also supra note 20 (highlighting 
the President’s delegation of powers to FEMA).  
259. MST Express, 108 F.3d at 402; 44 C.F.R. § 206.113 (2011).    
260. This controlling standard for agency review was established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
261. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
262. See La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, 608 F.3d 217, 224 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, “[t]o make this finding 
the court must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.”263 
The insurance qualifying factor may be vulnerable to claims that 
FEMA has abused its discretion in its application.  The language at the 
end of the FTCA’s immunity provision includes “whether or not the 
discretion be abused,” but this same phrase does not appear in the 
Stafford Act.264  In St. Tammany Parish, the Fifth Circuit turned the 
government argument claiming that the parameters of FEMA’s 
discretion were different from that of the FTCA on its ear, by pointing 
out that missing language.265  The same question had been raised, but not 
reached, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re World Trade 
Center Disaster Site Litigation.266  If FEMA had its way in the argument 
denying application of the FTCA standard, in a classic “be careful what 
you wish for” scenario, it could have strengthened an argument that 
even its discretionary action can be abused.  Plaintiffs parsing the two 
provisions for comparison may exploit that difference; the argument is 
certainly open to consideration. 
FEMA has never articulated a sound reason for adopting 
 
263. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1977). 
264. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011), with 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011). 
265. St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 321, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We also 
note that § 2680(a) [of the FTCA], unlike [42 U.S.C.] § 5148, prohibits claims ‘whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused.’  Thus, the FTCA may protect against abuses of discretion, 
while the Stafford Act may not.”); see In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 
169, 189 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008). 
We need not decide whether this distinction has any meaning in this case because 
the Parish has not argued that the government abused its discretion (it has limited 
its argument to whether the government had any discretion at all).  We note this 
difference here only as additional evidence that our holding does not render § 5148 
superfluous. 
St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 322 n.9. 
266. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d at 189 n.21. 
We note that immunity under the FTCA appears somewhat broader than that under 
the Stafford Act, as the FTCA adds ‘whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.’  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  Whether this suggests that the discretionary function 
immunity contained in the Stafford Act does not protect a government agency or 
employee from charges of abuse of discretion is a question we need not reach. 
Id.  
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compliance with state law as a valid criterion on which to base the award 
of transportation benefits.  Accordingly, it is difficult to predict how the 
government might address the contention that the requirement is 
arbitrary and capricious.  In Beno v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that a court should not “infer an agency’s reasoning from mere 
silence.”267  Thus far, FEMA has offered no reasoning for this rule, and 
certainly has not demonstrated that it has “consider[ed] . . . relevant 
factors.”268  It would be difficult to argue that refusing aid to those 
without liability insurance somehow furthers the mission of FEMA.  
The demographic profiles of uninsured motorists,269 seem to fall well 
within the categories of needy and disadvantaged disaster survivors 
about whom Congress expressed concern when considering disaster 
response legislation.270  The failure to assist the uninsured in this one 
category, and not in any other category of uninsured losses, is 
inexplicable.  Though this argument seems promising, we are warned 
that “[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, 
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”271 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION? 
As we know, the Stafford Act’s nonliability statute does not invoke 
the full spectrum of sovereign immunity for FEMA.  Courts have 
clarified that § 5148 protection runs only to nondiscretionary acts, and 
unlike the FTCA, may not even protect against abuse of discretion.272  A 
defense of virtually complete immunity and lack of jurisdiction over all 
claims against FEMA, even constitutional ones, seems unlikely to result 
in a wholesale dismissal.273  Nevertheless, consistent with its far-reaching 
view of immunity under the Stafford Act, the government has taken the 
position that § 5148 protects FEMA from challenges of unconstitutional 
 
267. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d. 1057, 1073–74 (9th Cir 1994). 
268. Id. 
269. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85 tbl.4. 
270. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
271. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1977). 
272. St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009); In re World 
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 189 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008). 
273. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812–13 (E.D. La. 2006); McWaters v. FEMA 
(McWaters I), 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228–29 (E.D. La. 2005). 
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conduct.274  In McWaters II, a district court case also brought by 
Hurricane Katrina survivors in 2005, challenging several actions and 
procedures by FEMA in providing rental assistance and housing 
benefits, the government sought dismissal of constitutional violations on 
the basis of immunity.275  Plaintiffs brought claims against FEMA on the 
basis of violations of the Stafford Act, Due Process Clause, and 
Administrative Procedure Act and sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief.276  The McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters I) court’s opinion reflects a 
somewhat incredulous tone addressing the contention that FEMA is 
immune from suit for constitutional violations, remarking that “it is also 
the government’s position that FEMA may commit unconstitutional 
acts and likewise not be subject to judicial review.”277  Indeed, in 
McWaters II, the government took the position that “this Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction” even though plaintiffs allege various 
constitutional violations.278  As the Supreme Court has explained, the 
United States must waive sovereign immunity for a court to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction over it, even if the plaintiff alleges a 
constitutional claim.279  Relying on Lynch v. United States, the 
government asserted that FEMA is immune from suit arising from 
constitutional causes of action.280 
Judicial review of agency action alleged to be unconstitutional has a 
conflicted history, with courts taking positions that, carried to logical 
 
274. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812.  
275. Id. at 805, 811–12.  
276. McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 226. 
277. Id. at 228.  
278. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812. 
279. Id. at 811–12 & n.16 (mentioning that FEMA “adamantly denies any 
unconstitutional action or any unlawful acts”).  This is not merely a characterization of 
FEMA’s position by the court.  In its post-trial brief, the government contented that: 
Further, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction even though plaintiffs allege 
various constitutional violations.  As the Supreme Court has explained, the United 
States must waive sovereign immunity for a court to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over it, even if the plaintiff alleges a constitutional claim.  “The 
sovereign’s immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or 
the source of the right sought to be enforced.  It applies alike to causes of action 
arising under acts of Congress, and to those arising from some violation of rights 
conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution.”  
Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 162, at 4 (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 
571, 582 (1934)). 
280. Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 162, at 4 (citing Lynch v. United States, 
292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934)).  
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conclusions, are hard to reconcile.281  The Supreme Court stated in 
Califano v. Sanders, “when constitutional questions are in issue, the 
availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a 
statutory scheme to take the ‘extraordinary’ step of foreclosing 
jurisdiction unless Congress’ intent to do so is manifested by ‘clear and 
convincing’ evidence.”282  In the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1987 
decision, Rosas v. Brock, the court stated “[i]t is far from clear that 
Congress could prevent judicial review of unconstitutional agency 
action.”283  Yet reasoning from other circuits leaves the question open, at 
least theoretically.284 
The precedent in respect to the context of constitutional questions 
regarding FEMA conduct in distributing benefits is clearer.  The 
McWaters II court relied on Rosas in holding that constitutional 
questions such as the one presented to it were, indeed, subject to 
review.285  It agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that agency conduct 
consistent with the Constitution is not a discretionary act, but a 
mandatory one.286  Once again, the “discretionary function” 
determination was dispositive as to the question of jurisdiction for 
judicial review.287 
Despite the government’s arguments contending that FEMA is 
subject to immunity from review of allegedly unconstitutional acts, 
arguments the government may well attempt in other circuits, it seems 
likely that a court would find constitutional questions raised by the 
adoption of a policy alleged to be discriminatory to be within its scope 
of review.  In such a case, a court would likely at least examine the 
merits of the alleged acts to see if plaintiffs state a colorable claim for an 
unconstitutional act or omission, as did the McWaters II court. 
 
281. For discussion of the complexity of this issue, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.9 (5th ed. 2010).  
282. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749, 762 (1975)). 
283. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986); Campbell v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 694 
F.2d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[I]t is well-established that Congress cannot preclude judicial 
review of allegedly unconstitutional agency action . . . .”)). 
284. PIERCE, supra note 281, § 17.9.  
285. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 n.18, 813 n.20 (E.D. La. 2006).  
286. Id. at 813 n.20. 
287. Id. at 812–14. 
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A. Due Process 
Challenges to FEMA actions for denial of benefits have sometimes 
been brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  To 
establish a due process violation, plaintiffs must show that they have a 
protected property interest and that “FEMA’s procedures are 
constitutionally inadequate.”288  Government benefits may be a form of 
property protected by the due process clause, but not all such benefits 
are within its protections.289  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that only where a person has a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to a 
benefit, and not a mere “abstract need or desire” or a “unilateral 
expectation” of receipt of the benefit does the due process protection 
arise.290 
In Ridgely v. FEMA,291 plaintiffs received rental assistance after 
Hurricane Katrina pursuant to section 408 of the Stafford Act, which 
deems individuals eligible for certain financial benefits if he or she is 
displaced from a home rendered uninhabitable as a result of a major 
disaster.292  The section’s corresponding regulations set out the criteria 
for both the initial application and continued rent assistance.293  The four 
representative Ridgely plaintiffs were each displaced from their homes 
and received financial rent assistance as a result of the disaster.294  Each 
representative plaintiff was told that the assistance would cover three 
months’ rent but that they could apply for additional funds in the future, 
if necessary.295  After the expiration of the period granted, they then 
received retroactive notices that they were no longer eligible for the 
assistance, with little time to find alternative housing.296  Moreover, some 
were told they must repay what they had received since the 
determination on ineligibility.297  They contended they had an interest in 
 
288. Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). 
289. Id. at 735.  
290. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 70 n.2 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
291. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 727.  
292. Id. at 729; see 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
293. 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.113–.114 (2011). 
294. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 729–30. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 730. 
297. Complaint at 24, 28–31, Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146, 2007 WL 1728724 (E.D. 
La. June 13, 2007), vacated, Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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the ongoing housing assistance that was wrongly taken without proper 
procedures.298 
Addressing the question of whether the rent assistance created a 
property interest needed to support a due process obligation on the part 
of FEMA, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in an analysis and 
comparison of FEMA benefits to other government benefits.299  First, it 
examined the statutory language to determine the level of discretion 
given to the agency.300  To find a property interest, the court must first 
find “explicitly mandatory language, i.e., specific directives to the 
decisionmaker [sic] that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are 
present, a particular outcome must follow.”301  The court examined both 
section 408 and its corresponding implementation regulations, finding 
that each was written in entirely permissive, not mandatory, terms.302 
Next, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs—who were 
receiving rental assistance—acquired a property interest in the 
continued payment of benefits.303  The lower court accepted the 
argument that once granted the benefit the plaintiffs were entitled to 
continued assistance, and therefore, plaintiffs had a property interest 
sufficient for due process procedures to be guaranteed under the 
Constitution.304  Relying on United States Supreme Court decisions that 
held continuing benefits from Social Security and welfare created a 
property interest,305 on appeal plaintiffs disputed the government’s 
position that the quarterly payments were effectively a termination and 
reissuance of rental aid.306  They noted that the three-month term for 
benefits is simply an informal policy of FEMA for its own convenience 
and purposes, not consistently applied, and that continuation of the 
benefits is similar to other benefit programs where continued or 
 
298. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 734–35. 
299. Id. at 736–37. 
300. Id.at 736. 
301. Id. at 735–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)). 
302. Id. at 736.  
303. Id. at 738–40. 
304. Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146, 2007 WL 1728724, at *6 (E.D. La. June 13, 2007).  
305. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (holding that a social 
security benefit was property interest sufficient for due process protections); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–64 (1970) (finding that plaintiffs who were denied welfare benefits 
had a property interest in those benefits which entitled them to a due process hearing)); 
Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 736. 
306. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 731–32, 738 n.10. 
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occasional assurance of the recipient’s ongoing qualification is 
required.307  All in all, the court found the facts failed to establish that 
plaintiffs had a property interest sufficient to support a due process 
claim.308 
A plaintiff claiming benefits pursuant to the “financial assistance” 
provisions of the Stafford Act and its regulations309 would have 
substantial difficulty establishing a “property interest” in such benefits 
because of the permissive nature of the laws and regulations establishing 
authority for that relief.  Accordingly, a due process challenge to the 
insurance mandate seems unlikely to be successful. 
B. Equal Protection 
A claim regarding the auto liability eligibility factor under the Equal 
Protection Clause could have more legs than a Due Process claim.  A 
claim against FEMA for economic discrimination would be both a 
Stafford Act statutory violation and an equal protection violation.310  A 
plaintiff might succeed in obtaining judicial review—or at least prevail 
against a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction— of a FEMA decision 
that allegedly constituted a constitutional violation, even if the 
implementation and application of the policy would otherwise be 
considered a “discretionary function” and immune from suit under 
§ 5148.311  Here, an action that alleged discrimination on the basis of 
economic status is more likely within the jurisdiction of the courts, so 
long as the constitutional claim is “colorable.”312 
How a challenge on that basis would fare in an Equal Protection 
analysis is, at very best, uncertain.  The United States Supreme Court 
“has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for 
purposes of equal protection analysis.”313  Actions which affect those of 
different economic status, treated as a nonsuspect classification, are 
subject to profound deference so long as the agency actions have any 
rational relationship to a legitimate end of government.314  Unless a 
 
307. Id. at 738 n.10.  
308. Id. at 740.  
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
310. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 817–18, 820–21 (E.D. La. 2006). 
311. Id. at 813, 818; see supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.  
312. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
313. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).   
314. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17, 28–29.  
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practice involves a fundamental right, such as voting or trial level 
indigent criminal defense—to which this right clearly does not rise—
 courts consider a regulation that may discriminate on the basis of 
economic status to be one concerning economic and social welfare 
policy and a legitimate exercise of governmental authority and 
discretion.315  Categorized in that manner, the FEMA insurance 
eligibility factor cannot be held to the higher level of scrutiny applicable 
to suspect classes,316 such as the strict scrutiny applied to racial 
classification317 or the intermediate scrutiny applied to gender 
classifications.318 
In that respect, the insurance mandate is not significantly different 
than other class “rational basis” questions presented to the United 
States Supreme Court.  Professor Robert C. Farrell noted in a 1999 
article that between 1971 and 1996, in only ten Supreme Court cases did 
a plaintiff defeat a rational basis defense by the government; one 
hundred had failed.319  None of those cases involved an economic 
classification.320  While the mandatory insurance requirement does not 
appear to be “rationally related” to the purposes of the Stafford Act,321 
 
315. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486–87, rehearing denied 398 U.S. 914 (1970). 
316. The grating of a gratuitous benefit, such as aid from FEMA, is not the kind of right 
protected by heightened scrutiny.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982) (“In 
determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed 
has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein.”). 
317. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 
318. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
319. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999). 
320. Id. at 411 (“The groups disadvantaged in these ten cases were newcomers, out-of-
staters, hippies, undocumented aliens, the mentally retarded, non-freeholders, and gays.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
321. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011)). 
It is the intent of the Congress, by this Act, to provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local 
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and 
damage which result from such disasters by– 
(1) revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief 
programs; 
(2) encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster 
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and 
organizations by the States and by local governments;  
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the bar is so low for FEMA to find a relationship to its mission that a 
court might be obliged to find in the agency’s favor.  FEMA does have a 
charge to “encourag[e] individuals” to obtain insurance, which might be 
sufficient to justify its use as an eligibility factor.322  Still, it is a stretch of 
logic to think that a policy that would not protect the property at issue in 
any event and that only affects a vehicle owner postdisaster has the 
effect to “encourage” households to comply with state liability insurance 
laws.  It is difficult to imagine a family who cannot afford auto liability 
insurance being motivated to purchase it nonetheless in the unlikely 
event that a major disaster were to threaten their personal 
transportation.323 
VII. POLITICAL ACTION 
One solution that would avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of 
a legal challenge to the FEMA requirement of auto liability insurance 
would be political action by the legislative or executive branch.  An 
informal, but binding, rule such as the auto insurance mandate could be 
altered within the agency itself or through direction from Congress, 
FEMA’s administration, or other executive branch authority.  FEMA 
has an Office of Equal Rights,324 which as far as can be determined, has 
 
(3) achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster 
preparedness and relief programs;  
(4) encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect 
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace 
governmental assistance;  
(5) encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from 
disasters, including development of land use and construction regulations; 
and  
(6) providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private 
losses sustained in disasters[.] 
42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).  The Stafford Act also included “(7) providing a long-range economic 
recovery program for major disaster areas.”  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 101, 88 Stat. 143, 144 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207). 
322. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4). 
323. Stephanie K. Jones, Uninsured Drivers Travel Under the Radar, INS. J., Aug. 18, 
2003, at 20, 21 (“‘I think given choices and a limited amount of money, most people will 
choose to pay their rent first, feed their kids second or some order thereof,’ said Texas 
Insurance Commissioner Jose Montemayor.  ‘And I think insurance falls pretty quickly a 
distant choice.  Unfortunately, this is reality.’”). 
324. Civil Rights Program, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/civil-rights-program (last 
updated July 16, 2012).  FEMA explains the function of the Office of Equal Rights: 
 
08 HORNSBY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2013  5:13 PM 
2013] ROADBLOCK TO RECOVERY 787 
yet to be presented with this issue.  Pursuit of this type of action seems 
worth the effort in light of the benefits to poor disaster survivors and the 
alternative of lengthy and uncertain legal battles. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Transportation is critical in disaster response, recovery, and 
rebuilding.  Obtaining basic shelter, food, water, and medical assistance 
in the days, weeks, and years following a disaster will likely require 
more dependence on private transportation than predisaster routines.  
Assuring that households and individuals may become as self-reliant—
 and available to help others—as quickly as possible is a highly 
desirable goal and absolutely essential to the larger good.325  Unrepaired 
and damaged vehicles on the roads can be dangerous to both their 
passengers and others.  It is counterintuitive and a direct impediment to 
recovery for federal disaster response to provide assistance for repair 
and replacement of personal vehicles, only to deny assistance to those 
unable to afford private insurance.326  The FEMA policy serves no 
purpose other than to punish auto owners who have not complied with 
state mandatory liability insurance laws327—a goal totally unrelated to 
 
 Complaints Resolution - Applicants for or recipients of FEMA federal funds, 
services or benefits who believe they have been discriminated against may contact 
the Office of Equal Rights (OER) to obtain complaint processing assistance.  
Generally applicants are described as the general public or disaster survivors (i.e. 
persons who have applied for individual disaster assistance) and contractors or sub-
grantees (i.e. person, company or state/local entity that has applied to be awarded or 
has been awarded FEMA federal funds.)  Furthermore, person or persons who 
represent the “general public, disaster survivors, contractors or sub-grantees” can 
also obtain complaint processing assistance from OER. 
 The matter will be looked into informally by an Equal Rights Specialist.  If the 
issue cannot be resolved informally, a formal written complaint may be filed with 
OER.  This office is responsible for processing complaints, issuing 
acknowledgements and acceptance/dismissals; conducting investigations and 
compliance reviews; and issuing final decisions. 
Id.  
325. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEMA PUBLICATION 30 (1st ed. Nov. 2010), 
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/pub1.pdf [hereinafter FEMA PUBLICATION] 
(“The response mission seeks to conduct emergency operations to save lives and property 
through positioning emergency equipment, personnel, and supplies; evacuating survivors; 
providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public 
services.”). 
326. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text. 
327. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No 
Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet 
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the critical need of assisting those whose lives have been affected by a 
major disaster. 
This effect is even more questionable when the state law that FEMA 
is enforcing against survivors is of questionable value in coping with the 
real problem of uninsured vehicles on our roads.328  Mandatory liability 
insurance may have a worthy goal of assuring that drivers on our roads 
will be covered for bodily injury and property damage caused by at-fault 
uninsured vehicle drivers, and states are certainly within their rights to 
enact and enforce auto insurance mandates to address the problem.  The 
effectiveness of these laws, however, is highly questionable in truly 
reducing the problem of uninsured drivers.329  While that decision is, of 
course, left to state legislators, wholesale adoption of these laws by a 
federal government agency with no relation to the problem is 
inexplicable. 
Moreover, the demographics of uninsured motorists illustrate that 
they are largely low income and cite the expense of auto insurance as 
the primary reason for failure to comply with mandatory liability 
insurance laws.330  An almost equal number are not insuring a vehicle 
because it is not currently being used,331 a rational reason that could be 
remedied should a previously unused vehicle be needed.  These owners 
are denied any assistance with repair in the event of damage from a 
disaster, even if they were to insure the vehicle in the future.332  Thus, 
even those who would insure a car once operational, or to add it to an 
existing policy, cannot get the help they may need to secure necessary 
transportation postdisaster.  The disproportionate effect of mandatory 
insurance laws is exacerbated by indications that insurance companies 
may discriminate against low-income drivers in both subtle and direct 
ways.333  Use of proxies such as credit ratings and other demographics 
allow insurance companies to, in effect, use the prohibited consideration 
of income as a factor in extending coverage.334  Basic liability policies 
 
the terms of state law.”). 
328. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says 
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34. 
329. Id. 
330. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85, 87.  
331. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 5.  
332. See Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.  
333. CFA Releases Study on Economic Harm to LMI Households from Over Price Auto 
Insurance, supra note 145 (referring to Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140). 
334. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140. 
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may cost more than full coverage for some drivers, and low-cost policies 
give such little protection that they may not be worth the expense to a 
household of few means.335 
Incorporating state auto insurance laws into a FEMA policy that 
penalizes survivors of disaster for lack of compliance directly conflicts 
with its larger policy goals and missions of assisting in disaster response, 
recovery, and rebuilding.336  Under the circumstances of most uninsured 
vehicle owners—those too poor to qualify for low-interest loans— the 
denial of financial assistance to repair or replace the auto serves no 
purpose consistent with FEMA’s mission.  The value to the federal 
government of this eligibility roadblock is dubious, and one wonders 
how it came about. 
Finally, FEMA’s adoption of this requirement without rulemaking is 
troubling.  The Stafford Act requires that rules for eligibility for benefits 
be promulgated with opportunity for comment and response. Despite 
that directive, the liability insurance requirement appears only in the 
most informal sources, with no rationale offered other than to comply 
with state laws.337  The lack of rulemaking renders the informal policy a 
potential statutory violation and has prevented an open forum in which 
to discuss the role of FEMA, the needs of disaster survivors denied 
benefits on the basis of lack of auto liability insurance, and the futility of 
attempts to enforce a variety of state laws in a disaster response context.  
FEMA may be most vulnerable to judicial review of the policy by way 
of this failure of process, since neither the Stafford Act nonliability 
provisions nor principals of sovereign immunity will protect it from 
judicial review where the disputed action is mandatory, such as in 
§ 5174(j).338 
Ironically, the cost of providing this aid is one of the lesser expenses 
encountered in disaster response.  It is difficult to estimate the number 
of affected households, since the total includes not only denials on the 
lack-of-liability-insurance basis, but also those who did not apply 
because the published criteria, information from the agency 
representatives, or legal advice led them to believe it was futile.  
 
335. Id. 
336. FEMA PUBLICATION, supra note 325, at 17. 
337. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No 
Liability Insurance:  Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet 
the terms of state law.”). 
338. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5148, 5174(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
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However, the permissible maximum amount granted per claim for all 
“other” (nonhousing) needs is $15,000, and the average grant is $2,000.339  
This relatively small amount could be sufficient to restore a vehicle to 
operation or it could be pooled among households to purchase a shared 
vehicle.  We know that a large percentage of uninsured vehicles are 
older models, many more than ten years old, and may have retained 
little monetary value.340  Only those with the most desperate financial 
situations—those unable to qualify for SBA low-interest disaster 
loans—would be within the grantees.341  Yet, one can easily imagine that 
the availability of transportation could make the difference in the ability 
to become self-reliant after a disaster. 
 Court challenge, agency action, or reconsideration by the 
administration of FEMA’s position on this policy is warranted.  FEMA 
 
339. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, UNIT 7: INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE 7.7 tbl. 
(2010), available at http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/IS208A/08_SDM_Unit_07_508.pdf.  
FEMA describes the limits of “Other Needs Assistance” in its Disaster Assistance for 
Individuals and Business Owners Table.  Id.  The Table is divided into “Program/Agency” 
and lists the “Assistance,” “Eligibility,” “Specific Criteria,” and “Supplemental Materials 
Reverence” associated with each program or agency.  Id.  For the “IHP: Other Needs 
Assistance” program, “[a]dministered and funded by FEMA,” the Table lists the 
“Assistance,” “[g]rants to meet serious disaster-related needs and necessary expenses not 
covered by insurance or other Federal, State, or voluntary agencies;” the “Eligibility,” 
“[a]vailable to persons and households with serious unmet needs who do not qualify for SBA 
disaster loans;” the “Specific Criteria,” “[m]aximum grant of up to $15,000[] depending on 
family composition and needs,” noting that the “[c]ap changes each fiscal year to 
accommodate Consumer Price Index” but that “[t]he average grant is approximately $2,000;” 
and the “Supplemental Materials Reverence,” “IHP Fact Sheet.”  Id.  
340. See HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 6; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85 tbl.4. 
341. Do I Qualify for “Other Than Housing Needs” Assistance?, FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/do-i-qualify-other-housing-needs-assistance (last updated June 25, 
2012).  FEMA states the eligibility for “Other Than Housing Needs” as follows: 
To receive money for “Other Than Housing Needs” that are the result of a disaster, 
all the following must be true: 
x You have losses in an area that has been declared a disaster area by the 
President. 
x You have filed for insurance benefits and the damage to your property is not 
covered by your insurance or your insurance settlement is insufficient to meet your 
losses. 
x You or someone who lives with you is a citizen of the United States, a non-
citizen national, or a qualified alien. 
x You have necessary expenses or serious needs because of the disaster. 
x You have accepted assistance from all other sources for which you are 
eligible, such as insurance proceeds or Small Business Administration disaster loans.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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acknowledges that “[r]ecovery focuses not only on saving and sustaining 
lives, but also on providing for the short- and long-term needs of 
individuals and communities.”342  If a thoughtful, thorough examination 
of the effects of the auto insurance mandate were undertaken in light of 
FEMA’s true purpose, the questions regarding the legality and the 
wisdom of the policy create difficulty justifying retention of the 
standard. 
 
 
342. FEMA PUBLICATION, supra note 325, at 35. 
